SECURITY FOR AUSTRALIA?

KEITH A. W. CROOK
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Keith Crook's concern to express spiritual insights in practical political terms has its origins in his early association with the Methodist Church and the Student Christian Movement.

Following a period of military service in 1955 which he entered with an uneasy conscience, he commenced attending Sydney Meeting of Friends. He subsequently refused further military service and was granted exemption as a conscientious objector. He became a member of the Society of Friends in 1958.

Since his association with Friends his concern has enlarged and deepened. From 1954 to 1956 he was Sydney secretary of the Volunteer Graduate Scheme, and was International Officer of the Sydney University Students' Representative Council in 1955.

Moving to Armidale in 1956 to do doctoral research in geology, he became a founding committee member of the local Aborigine Advancement Association.

He spent 1959-1961 in Canada on post-doctoral research, during which time he was secretary of the Prairie Meeting of Friends within Canadian Yearly Meeting.

Returning to Australia to a lectureship in geology at the Australian National University, he commenced a degree in political science, which he completed in 1966. He was convenor of the Quaker Committee on Legislation, a committee of Australian Yearly Meeting during its operation from 1962 to 1966.

He spent four months in the U.S.S.R. and five in the U.S.A. in 1967.

In 1963 he joined the Australian Labor Party, becoming secretary of its Science Policy Committee in 1964, a position he still holds. He stood as a candidate in the 1969 Federal elections.

He has co-authored two books and written several articles on sedimentary geology and a number of articles on political topics. He is married with three children.

Copyright December, 1969, by The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Australia Incorporated.
The James Backhouse Lecture

This is the seventh in a series of lectures instituted by Australia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends on the occasion of the establishment of that Yearly Meeting on January 1, 1964. This lecture was delivered in Melbourne, Victoria, on January 11, 1970, during the sessions of the Yearly Meeting.

James Backhouse was an English Friend who visited Australia from 1832 till 1838. He and his companion, George Washington Walker, travelled widely, but spent most of their time in Tasmania, then known as Van Diemen's Land. It was through this visit that Quaker Meetings were first established in Australia. James Backhouse was a botanist who published full scientific accounts of what he saw, besides encouraging Friends, and following up his deep concern for the convicts and for the welfare of the aboriginal inhabitants of the country.

Australian Friends hope that this series of lectures will bring fresh insights into truth, often with some particular reference to the needs and aspirations of Australian Quakerism.

In relation to this year's lecture, which has clear political implications for Australia, it should be said that the Society of Friends, as a religious organisation, does not support any particular party or any particular foreign policy worked out in all its details. It has frequently made statements such as those supporting the giving of international aid, opposing conscription and Australia's involvement in the war in Viet Nam; its members have worked for peace in manifold ways. We welcome Keith Crook's lecture as the expression of one Friend's concern which will aid and stimulate Friends and others in thinking about the problems with which he deals.

RICHARD G. MEREDITH, Presiding Clerk
Australia Yearly Meeting
The present pamphlet has been published by Australia Yearly Meeting. Further copies may, be obtained from Friends Meetings in Australia, from Eric B. Pollard, 10 Latona Street, Pymble, New South Wales, Australia 2073, or Friends Book Centre, Euston Rd., London, N.W.1.

--------------------

AUTHOR'S NOTE: The author would like to acknowledge the help given in the early stages of preparation of this lecture by Keith Watson, of Canberra, on behalf of the Australian Quaker Peace Committee.
Introduction

Before the House of Assembly elections in Papua-New Guinea in 1964 a candidate in the Western Highlands District opened his campaign with the following speech: "Listen, you ignorant fellows! You people have no idea of how to get to Australia - but I'll tell you how! At Hagen where I come from we have a road. It is a special road, known only to a few of us. Down along this road one comes to a great stone. It is a large stone, but one man can move it if he knows how. I know how! If the stone is tapped with a special sort of stick it will open, and underneath it is a hole, with a ladder going down into the ground. I have been down the ladder, and I know where it leads. At the bottom of the ladder there is an airfield, on which is a plane that waits to take you to Sydney in Australia. You follow me! I know the way!" This man was subsequently elected to the House of Assembly.

Was this simply one deluded, partly-sophisticated New Guinean leading astray his unsophisticated fellows? No, this was "tok bokis," the traditional, highly allegorical Western Highlands ways of speaking about important things. The story he told was a modernised version of an ancient legend, well known to his listeners, which explained how leaders acquired special powers and brought benefit to the people by visiting the underworld. This man was speaking to the needs and condition of his people metaphorically in words they could readily understand. Small wonder that he was the popular choice as representative of that electorate.

As in New Guinea, so in Australia-the needs and condition of the people must be spoken to in words they readily understand. But our "tok bokis" is not allegorical, nor is it about the way to Sydney, the "source of all good things." It does however draw heavily on our traditions, particularly those deriving from our cultural and historic ties to the nations of the North Atlantic region and our geographic remoteness from that region.

That part of our "tok bokis" which concerns our national security is particularly dominated by traditions of this origin. And in this decade more than those before, the relevance of this "tok bokis" and its associated policies is increasingly being questioned. Fundamentally the question is this: how, in the age of nationalism, nuclear warfare, and national liberation
movements, can a sparsely populated western nation, situated on the edge of Asia, achieve security?

That such a question should be the theme of a lecture sponsored by a religious society may occasion some surprise: did not Jesus say: "Do not be anxious about tomorrow, but seek first God's kingdom"? As individuals we may give priority to God's kingdom. However, in so doing we should not mistake personal for national priorities. As Quakers we are concerned particularly for peace, an attribute of God's kingdom. If this concern is to be shared by our nation we must communicate with the nation, not only in terms of Jesus' priorities, but also in terms that speak to the nation's present condition. We must answer relevant questions by contributing to the "tok bokis" of our society just as Jesus did to his.

During the past fifteen years Australian "tok bokis" has thrown up a number of slogans which claim to offer a partial or complete answer to the question of national security. They are familiar: "Communist China must be contained"; "prevent the downward thrust of Communist imperialism"; "our obligations under SEATO"; "great and powerful friends"; "ANZUS is essential and must be retained"; "all the way with LBJ"; "the policeman on the beat"; "one of the posse"; "better to fight them there than here" - and there are many others. This plethora of slogans reflects our national policy: forward defence in alliance with a great power.

Both policy and slogans have failed to provide a lasting answer to our question. This we realise as we observe the varied reactions of Australians to Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez, America's withdrawal from the Asian mainland, and the Soviet Union's growing interest in our region.

The policy of forward defence has not failed us because of international events beyond our control. These are but symptoms of the policy's inadequacy. The inadequacy is fundamental, and is bound up with our view of the world.

Australians really are a weird mob! Is there anywhere else a people so strange that, calling themselves a nation, they yet lack a comprehensive
home-made view of the world and of their role in it? For this, in truth, is our situation.

Australia is probably the least nationalist nation on earth. In much of our thinking we mark no more difference between Australia and other white English-speaking nations, than between Scotland and England, or Texas and California. Psychologically Australia is still an overseas part of the United Kingdom or, failing that, a remote member of that other English-speaking union, the United States of America.

The consequences of this state of mind permeate all aspects of our national life. They are revealed in our attitude to exploitation of our natural resources, in the control and management of our industries, in the way our performing arts have developed, in our immigration and citizenship laws, in the imitative character of our mass culture, and in many other ways. But this state of mind is revealed pre-eminently in our foreign policy.

Australia's foreign policy, past and present, can be described, without much distortion, as an amalgam of two elements. The dominant element is a great-power identification - a wish to act as an extension of Britain or the United States.

The other element has predominated only rarely and derives from our geographic isolation from the sources that inspire the dominant element. It is an acute sensitivity to real or imagined foreign threats. Our historic reactions to such threats certainly constitute a national insecurity complex. On occasion this has verged on paranoia. Only rarely has it produced policy decisions that seem, on hindsight, to have been justified.

These two elements recur throughout our history, from the building of Fort Denison in Sydney Harbour to resist an expected Russian invasion during the Crimean War down to our involvement in the Vietnamese Civil War—the recurrent foreign invasion scares of last century, leading on occasion to mobilisation; the annexation of Papua by Queensland; the origins of the White Australia policy in the spectre of the Yellow Peril; the sending of contingents to the Sudan War and the Boer War; Gallipoli, and our massive commitment to the Western Front in World War I; our resistance to Japanese mandates in the western Pacific following that war;
our declaration of war automatically with Britain in World War II; our dispute with Churchill over the deployment of Australian troops returning from the western desert during World War II; our support for Britain in the Suez Crisis of 1956; our early support for South Africa which has been transformed into ambivalence and extended to embrace Rhodesia; our Whitehall-derived foreign policy of the 20's and 30's and our Washington-derived foreign policy of the 50's and 60's; our readiness to accept foreign military establishments that are prime nuclear targets, without real debate about their function or the consequences for our security; our acceptance of these bases without any physical guarantee that they and we will be protected should need arise; and, most recently, our unwillingness to renounce nuclear weapons by signing the non-proliferation treaty. And these are but the highlights.

Once only in our history, and then briefly, have we departed from this pattern of behaviour. During the term of Dr. H. V. Evatt as Minister for External Affairs a distinctive Australian foreign policy, of global scope and internationalist temper, was developed by Evatt and his departmental officers. This led to notable Australian initiatives during the founding and early years of the United Nations, to the rapid expansion of our diplomatic service, to support for Indonesian independence, and to attitudes to developing nations that bore fruit in the Colombo Plan.

Unfortunately there remained a sufficient reliance on our traditional affiliations with great powers to ensure that we became aligned in the Cold War. Unfortunately too, Evatt made small effort to sell his ideas to the Australian public. This interlude therefore had little lasting effect, except in the politically insignificant field of foreign aid, where some useful traditions have become established.

Our foreign policies are an almost inevitable by-product of our origins as an immigrant people colonising a remote land during a period of world power dominance by our cultural kin, Britain and the United States. Remoteness and domestic conditions have produced here a local variant of Anglo-Saxon culture. They have, however, failed to produce a nation in the full sense.

The real significance of recent power political changes in our region
is not that they necessitate a revision of our foreign and defence policies. These changes are having a more fundamental effect-they are forcing us to complete the process of nation-building. As reliance on our identification with great powers becomes less tenable, we are forced to act and plan on our own initiative. Inevitably this raises questions of our view of the world, and our role in it. And in answering such questions we are, just as inevitably, contributing to the growth of Australian nationalism.

How are we, who love peace and brotherhood, to view this growth of nationalism? Nationalism is the predominant force of the last millennium-the rock on which has foundered the unity of three major world faiths - Islam, Christianity and Communism. It has contributed greatly to the disruption of the family of man. It has so far proved irresistible.

Clearly we are both naive and foolish if we live in the hope that nationalism will disappear, nor can we quietly refrain from considering it. Rather we must accept the fact of nationalism and seek to understand the positive function it fulfils.

An insufficient sense of nationalism can lead to anarchy, as in the Congo (Kinshasa). Or, as in Australia's case, it can lead to an imitative world view at variance both with geographic reality and national capabilities-and when geographic realities make themselves felt, the national reaction can easily be disastrously inappropriate.

Most nations suffer from a surfeit of nationalism. Paradoxically, in a world in which divisive nationalism is rampant, Australian nationalism must grow stronger if Australia is to solve the problem of her security and so be able to take her place as a force for the peaceful advancement of mankind. For this we need a nationalism purged of anti-social attributes, a nationalism that knows sober pride and self-identity, but riot chauvinism; a nationalism that is consistent with internationalism.

Will this be the outcome of the nationalism growing in our midst? Perhaps, if we work to produce it, for the necessary ingredients are all present in our traditions, geographic position and resources. But work will be needed, for there are seemingly easier ways out of our present situation that lead to a quite different kind of nationalism, more akin to that
widespread in southern Africa. These are seen in the new "tok bokis" that is developing as alternatives to existing foreign and defence policies are tentatively advanced: - "fortress Australia"; "an Israeli-style army"; "Australia armed and neutral"; "an Australian nuclear capability"; "regional arrangements."

These slogans sum up the two major alternatives to present policy. One, which must be seen as a transitional provision, is the official policy of the Australian Labor Party (1). This envisages a development of military arrangements with our neighbours, involving us in joint training programs and joint manufacture and purchasing of equipment, all within the context of a continuing, if less immediate, great-power alliance.

The other more radical alternative is held in variant forms by the Prime Minister, Mr. J. G. Gorton (privately, it appears); Dr. Jim Cairns (2), Mr. Max Teichmann (3), and some members of the DLP. It envisages a "fortress Australia," variously with or without nuclear weapons, and aligned or non-aligned in the East-West confrontation.

The suggested new policies draw heavily upon elements traditional to Australian foreign policy, but not all neglect the Evatt interlude. The ALP concept of regional arrangements seeks to conserve our great-power identification and blend with it an updated and limited version of Evatt's internationalism. Fortress Australia is, in essence, the logical product of our national insecurity complex, moderated by internationalism in the non-nuclear, non-aligned version; intensified to the verge of paranoia in the nuclear arms version; and bolstered by maintenance of great-power identification in the aligned version. In none of these suggestions does internationalism dominate, as it must if our newly found nationalism is to contribute positively to the welfare of mankind.

This then defines the task before us—to develop, if possible, to the question of national security, an answer dominated by internationalism.

**What Threatens Our Security?**

The first phase of our task is to identify the dangers that really threaten us, and to determine whether there is substance in those threats that
we vaguely fear.

*Invasion: The Hordes to the North*

Not far to our north live many hundred million people. Our commonly-held impression is that these people live in nations that are under-nourished, under-developed, over-populated, and restless. Australia, in contrast, is twice the size of India, rich in natural resources, economically advanced and yet has a population of only twelve million. Aware of this contrast, we naturally assume that the nations to our north see Australia as a desirable country in which to settle their overflowing populations.

Is this fear realistic? Would it be worthwhile for a foreign power to attempt to occupy Australia? What might be the motives for such an occupation?

There seem to be several possibilities: (1) to ease domestic population pressures; (2) to gain control of Australia's physical resources; (3) to build up national prestige; (4) to remove threats, either real or imagined, arising out of Australian behaviour; and (5) to weaken Australian democracy for political advantage.

Turning first to the problem of population pressure: The population of China is about 600 million and is increasing by 10 to 15 million a year. If Chinese emigrants were shipped to Australia at the rate of 1500 a day for the next ten years the number moved would be no more than is added to China's population in six months! Clearly China's population problem cannot be solved by emigration.

Indonesia, with a population of 100 million, has most of her people crowded on the island of Java, while neighbouring Sumatra and Kalimantan are relatively underpopulated. There is ample room within Indonesia for the excess population of Java, but residents of Java have shown little inclination to move, despite governmental encouragement. Indonesia's population problem must be solved at home.

The development of resources, be they minerals, food, or human
labour, must likewise be tackled in the country concerned. All the major countries to the north of Australia, except Japan, are fairly rich in undeveloped natural resources. In those regions where people are underfed, food production could be greatly increased by land reform and better farming methods. Development of labour-intensive industries would give people employment. These countries need science, technology, managerial skills, capital and trade-things that Australia is well placed to give.

Australia's rich natural resources are potentially important to the nations of Asia. So long as peace prevails they can be purchased and transported cheaply by sea to points in Asia, where they can help in building the economies of Asian nations. But the same does not apply in time of war. The difficulties of maintaining supplies by sea to a nation at war were vividly demonstrated in the case of Britain in World War II. Technological developments since then have increased these difficulties.

Furthermore, any foreign power wishing to control Australia's industrial potential would have to reckon with the possibility of widespread destruction of industries as a consequence of invasion. Short of a biological warfare strike of genocidal dimensions, an invader could take over our industries to good effect only with the co-operation of the Australian people.

Japan's example is illuminating. Her attempt to control markets and resources by military means ended in nuclear devastation. But now, as a result of initiative at home and peaceful penetration abroad, she enjoys the highest standard of living in Asia.

The Asian revolution is another potential source of aggression. Some nations have used external adventures as a means of securing domestic solidarity and enhancing national prestige. Indonesia's confrontation policy of the early sixties had this motivation.

Some nation in our region may well embark on this kind of limited aggression some time in the future, although there appears no prospect of it at present. It can best be controlled through UN peacekeeping action. The introduction of foreign troops merely exacerbates the situation.
Because of Australia's geographic position, direct threats of aggression of this type can come from only two potential sources—Indonesia and an independent Papua-New Guinea. Indonesia was unwilling to threaten us directly in the early sixties despite our previous opposition to her West Irian claim and our support for Malaysia. Whether she should ever feel differently will depend in significant measure on our sensitivity and response to her problems. The same can be said for Papua-New Guinea after independence.

West Irian should not be overlooked as a potential source of strife that could threaten Australia. Although Indonesia and ourselves have reached a settled position in respect to it, this does not apply to all West Irianese or to Papuans and New Guineans. A Free Papua Movement based on independent East New Guinea and operating into West Irian is a possible future development. A subsequent development could be an alliance between Papua-New Guinea and a great power with the object of uniting New Guinea.

We must attend to this matter now, while its disruptive potential remains hypothetical. Its resolution will prove difficult, but it is amenable to peaceful initiatives that can de-fuse the problem. If the problem reaches the point where a military solution seems necessary we will have only ourselves to blame.

A further possible class of threat is one arising from Australia's attitude towards the region. Some nation which felt that Australia constituted a threat to her security might launch a pre-emptive attack against us. If we try to see ourselves as the people of some neighbouring Asian country might see us, it is not hard to imagine that we could appear to threaten their security, especially if we were to allow nuclear bases on Australian territory with missiles poised for use against possible attack from the north. We remember American reactions to Soviet missiles in Cuba. As long as there is some basis for fear, imagination can combine with national interest to create hostile attitudes which can then be strengthened by propaganda. Whether a nation fears Australian motives depends almost entirely on our own behaviour. It follows that steps toward mutual understanding between ourselves and others, especially relatively unstable nations, are of the utmost importance for security.
There is yet another motive that could inspire aggression against Australia. This is the cold war tactic of harassment, of which China's recent activity on the Sino-Soviet border is an example. Might not some nation wish to frustrate our attempts to exemplify peaceful Western democracy by attacking us? Aggression of this kind would, in the contemporary world, need to be supported by a propaganda campaign based on some alleged Australian "misbehaviour." Here again the remedy lies with us. An Australian foreign policy determinedly peaceful and internationalist in character would make justification of this sort of attack difficult for the aggressor.

*Communism. "When the Red Revolution Comes"*

Fear of Communism is widespread amongst Australians. There are three elements in this fear. The first, now obsolescent, sees Communism as a world conspiracy that may involve Australia in world war for the third time within a century. This reaction to Communism has barely survived the Sino-Soviet rift and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The second element is the direct threat to Australia from Asian Communism. The nation that is commonly cast in the threatening role is China. This is not new, for Australians have been worried about the "yellow peril" for over a century. But the new dynamism imparted to China by Communism has made the threat seem more real. We think of China's intervention in the Korean War, of Tibet, of the incidents on the Sino-Indian border, of China's support for North Viet Nam, and of Mao Tse Tung's statement (made in 1938) that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Many Australians see in this the familiar outlines of a grand strategy of world conquest, with Australia high on the list of prospects.

Yet, despite its belligerent words, and its undoubted military potential, China's actions have, by comparison, been curiously restrained.

China's actions bear a family resemblance to those of other great powers, suggesting that a "great power dynamic," rather than a Communist crusade for world hegemony, lies behind these actions. Chinese intervention in Korea and American sponsorship of the Bay of Pigs
invasion of Cuba are similar kinds of reaction to perceived threats. Likewise China's reassertion of her tradition hegemony over Tibet, differs little from President Polk's acquisition of the U.S. south-west from Mexico more than a century before. Both used military force and expropriation to increase the territory and resources of the dominant power, and both felt they had a civilising mission to perform.

If a "great power dynamic" motivates China's international activities, we may expect her to be content ultimately with a peripheral sphere of influence, and more diffuse influence in more distant areas. And we may look to a moderation of the fervour to export revolution once China's living standard commences to rise appreciably.

A Chinese-dominated satellite empire in southern Asia does not seem a likely prospect. No country the size of Indonesia - be it Communist-governed or not - is going to take kindly to a subservient position. And with the break-up of the Communist monolith into independent, Moscow-oriented and Peking-oriented Communist parties, maintaining such a satellite empire would be difficult. Indeed China was apparently unable to bring into line a country so favourably placed as North Vietnam, to judge from the latter's attendance and attitudes at the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in April 1966.

There is little in the present situation that suggests we are likely to become embroiled with China, and there is some reason to hope that normal relations can be developed. Certainly there is no immediate direct threat to Australia from China, which has a negligible navy and bomber force (4).

The third element in Australians' fear of Communism - the threat of internal Communist subversion - is now of limited significance. With its small membership (about 5,000) and internal division into two ideologically antipathetic parties, Communism in Australia no longer has much potential for serious internal subversion. In any case, as India discovered when China attacked her border regions, the foreign alignment of many Communists breaks down in the face of a direct threat to their nation.
No analysis would be complete without some examination of the "domino theory." Australians, being perhaps more interested in Chinese checkers than dominoes, express this theory as follows: "But we can't let the Communists succeed in Viet Nam, because then they'd take Laos, and Cambodia, and Thailand, and so on, and before we knew it they'd be on our doorstep."

Even were such a chain reaction to occur, the result would probably not be the monolithic Communist empire that we commonly imagine. The domino theory gives a misleading view of the potentialities in the Asian situation.

First, it assumes that the nations of Southeast Asia are incapable of resisting Communism. In fact, of the nine states in the region, four - Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines - have put down Communist uprisings, Indonesia having done so twice. Two more, Cambodia and Singapore, have developed non-Communist polities of a character sufficiently radical to limit greatly the domestic appeal of Communism.

Second, the domino theory neglects the forces of nationalism. As explained at length in another Quaker publication (5), in southern Asia Communism can succeed only by espousing the objectives of local nationalism. For peculiar historical reasons Communism has fused with local nationalism in Viet Nam. Under the aegis of Soekarno and Aidit, it came close to doing this in Indonesia. However, success elsewhere in the region does not appear likely for there the groups principally identified with nationalist sentiments are not Communist.

In his book "Australia's Defence," T. B. Millar (5) has provided a valuable assessment of the threats to our security from various sources.
Three past or prospective Asian aggressors are examined, Japan, China and Indonesia. Because of its political alignment Japan poses no immediate threat, but given a change in alignment - a long-term process - Japan could become a significant threat, as she already has the largest air force and navy in Asia. China, as we have already noted, is now militarily too weak to be able to attack Australia. Any threat from her is also long-term in nature.

Indonesia has the military capacity to inflict damage on Australia, but could not mount a sustained major attack. This capability may be regarded as a minor threat, but it, too, is hypothetical and not immediate.

It can be taken as established that the major threats which Australia faces are of a long-term character, probably maturing 10 to 20 years hence. This fact is of crucial importance, for we must ask whether present policies will in fact promote Australian security in the world of ten to twenty years hence. Furthermore the long-term character of these threats gives us time to develop and adopt new policies should the existing ones be inadequate.

Before we leave this subject we must examine another kind of threat that Australia has been facing, in theory at least. The threat is of an unusual character, and arises from our recent military involvements. The small likelihood of its ever eventuating is counterbalanced by the grave consequences it would have. The Australian government has omitted to tell us about this threat, although it is symptomatic of the age of nuclear powers and the ICBM.

Let us assume that, in place of a U.S. withdrawal there had been further escalation of the Viet Nam war, with American ground attacks on North Vietnam. China, in keeping with its decision in the Korean war, has sent in "volunteers," and there is talk in the U.S., as casualties rise, of using tactical nuclear weapons to regain control of the situation. (And remember, this would not have seemed a far-fetched development only two years ago.) At this point the Soviet Union fearing that further inaction would completely undermine its prestige, threatens to put an H-bomb on Sydney or Melbourne if the U.S. threat is carried out. The U.S. decides to call the Soviet Union's bluff, and they, and we, find that it was no bluff. One of our cities is destroyed.
Would the U.S. go to war with the U.S.S.R. in memory of Sydney? And would it avail us any if we did? No. The "Hot Line" would run hot, the world would teeter at the brink, and then draw back. No U.S. president can risk the death of 100 million Americans unless the North American mainland itself is directly threatened.

It is a bizarre, but just possible situation - Australia attracting a nuclear attack because she is a minor partner in an alliance. We may feel inclined to dismiss it as too fantastic. However possibilities of this kind were causing some concern in appropriate Canberra circles only four years ago.

Now this threat differs from those already considered in that it is a by-product of our defence and foreign policies. This suggests that there is another class of threat to our security which we have thus far failed to examine-namely ourselves.

Ourselves: "The Price of Fear"

For the present, and in the foreseeable future, there is little intrinsic basis for conflict between Australia and her Asian neighbours. However if our policies continue to be motivated by fear and great-power identification, rather than by constructive and purposeful national ideals, we will be inviting trouble. The years ahead in the Asian region will be tumultuous, for the modernising revolution in Asia is far from complete. Australians will be in a position similar to those Quakers of the American colonies who lived surrounded by racial wars. Shall we enclose ourselves in a fortress behind an immigration barrier, discriminating and taking sides against our neighbours, thereby inviting ourselves into the turmoil of revolution, nationalism, propaganda and violence? Or shall we, like the Quakers of early Pennsylvania, respect our neighbours as fellow humans and try to assist them to peaceful solutions to their problems, perhaps in so doing setting an example to the rest of the world?

If the past is any indication, there is a very real danger that we will ourselves breed in our environment the very insecurity that we wish to avoid. This must not be allowed to happen.
Our Present Security System and its Implications

The basis of our present security system is our membership of the Western alliance. To this we are tied by four major strands in our defence policy-ANZUS, SEATO, ANZAM and the agreements governing the U.S. military establishments at Northwest Cape, Pine Gap and Woomera.

Under ANZUS, which is widely regarded as the primary guarantee of our security, anyone who takes on Australia takes on the United States; but, contrariwise, we must not forget that if the United States is attacked, as could easily have happened during the Cuban missile crisis, then we are obligated to fight alongside her.

SEATO commits us to the defence of Thailand, 'the Philippines and Viet Nam, but it has not operated collectively in the Viet Nam war and is widely regarded as obsolescent. ANZAM involves us in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, even after the British withdrawal. The U.S. military establishments agreements make us an integral part of the American global nuclear weapons system.

The scope of our potential involvement is clearly very large, for our formal commitments are extensive. Our more specific commitments are geographically limited to a band extending from Malaysia in the West to the U.S. Pacific Territories in the East. This forms a wall or bastion, with China on the outside. This style of thinking has its weaknesses, for the wall may be breached-as by non-aligned Laos and Cambodia. Alternatively, it may be over-stepped, as when the Djakarta-Peking axis was proclaimed in 1965. Such territorially-based security concepts seem outmoded with the advent of ICBM's and nuclear submarines.

The non-military aspects of Australia's present security system are governed by the belief that Australia's foreign policy should be closely modelled on that of our principal allies. Problems inevitably arise when British and American policies conflict, as during the Suez crisis, or when we face an issue on which neither ally has an explicit policy.
Australian policies that lack explicit British or U.S. support commonly show evidence of improvisation and have tended to prove inadequate when the chips are down. Our West Irian policy prior to 1961 involved active support for the Dutch. However, it was unrealistic in its assessment of the lengths to which Indonesia would go in pursuit of her objective. It also under-estimated the role of world political opinion in the issue, and revealed a poor judgement of the likely U.S. response to the possibility of war over West Irian. Characteristically, our policy changed only when the U.S. adopted a clear policy on the matter - one that was largely opposed to our previous policy.

There is an important lesson here. We started from the assumption that West Irian was of vital strategic importance to us-that it must remain in friendly (i.e. pro-Western) hands. To this end we supported the Dutch after 1949, thus straining our hitherto very friendly relationship with Indonesia. By so doing Australia became an accessory before the fact of Indonesia's permanent revolution. "Irian Barat" (West Irian) was the slogan used by Soekarno and others to maintain the revolutionary fervour in Indonesia, that ultimately led to the proclamation of the Djakarta-Peking axis, and the anti-communist coup of 1965. Lest we think of our role as minor, we should reflect that the Dutch position in West Irian in the fifties would have been no more tenable in the face of combined Australian and Indonesian disapproval than was the Dutch position in Indonesia as a whole in the late forties in the face of similar disapproval.

In the final analysis, our West Irian policy collapsed. Having misjudged so many factors, we were left without adequate means of ensuring that the West Irianese would be able to exercise their right to self-determination. We were faced with a neighbour much less tractable than ten years before. And we now find that West Irian is not vital to our security after all. Truly Australia reaped where she sowed.

Australia's attitudes to many world questions, notably those involving colonial territories and southern Africa, have showed similar short-sightedness. Between 1950 and 1960 our U.N. representatives regularly voted against, or failed to support moves aimed at involving the U.N. in both colonial and southern African questions. We justified this attitude by the legalistic view that the U.N. Charter limits the U.N.'s
competence to deal with matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Behind this was the fear that, if the U.N. became involved in colonial issues and questions of domestic race relations, Australia's restrictive immigration policy, neglect of Aborigine advancement and slow progress in Papua-New Guinea would come under attack. Thus we came to be viewed by some as being among the most reactionary nations. It is doubtful that we were more secure because of our stand. If anything it directed attention to our domestic and colonial policies.

Since 1960 our attitudes on such questions have been less rigid. However no distinctive policy has emerged. Our rigidity has been replaced by ad hoc responses of conservative temper guided by our great-power affiliations.

The logical result of Australia's military alliances, military involvements in Viet Nam and elsewhere, and international political posture, is that China certainly, and perhaps other nations as well, will develop their strategic military planning on the basis that Australia will be, to them, an enemy power. China is already a nuclear power, and in ten to twenty years will have an intercontinental nuclear strike capacity sufficient to provide an immediate and direct threat to Australia. In other words, nuclear weapons will be targeted on Australian cities, from both land-based ICBM's and submarines, if not from satellites. We may quite truthfully revise the common phrase "Australia is in Viet Nam because her long-term security is threatened" to read "because Australia is in Viet Nam her long-term security is threatened."

We must recognise that, in a world with nuclear weapons, it is highly dangerous for any but major- or super-powers to use conventional forces outside their homelands (unless in U.N. peace-keeping forces). The long-term result is likely to be a decrease in the security of any nation so involved, because of nuclear confrontation.

The prospect of nuclear confrontation should be very sobering. Once a nuclear rocket attack is launched, Australia cannot defend herself against it. We are sitting ducks, with 84% of our population ' in 4% of our land area. Only by ensuring that no such attack will be launched will Australia's security be preserved. There is but one means to this end that is consistent
with our present policy, namely to make the cost to a potential enemy too
great by adopting a policy of deterrence.

For a policy of deterrence to be effective, Australia must have access
to nuclear weapons. There are four ways of achieving this (7):

First, Australia could shelter under the American nuclear umbrella. This has the dangerous weakness that the U.S. would retaliate on our behalf only if she could be sure that there would be no counter-strike against North America. We may feel that the U.S. would honour its treaty obligations and protect Australia regardless of the consequences. This is expecting a lot, particularly when there is an excellent historical precedent for the U.S. to act otherwise. Despite the existence of a firm treaty commitment to aid France, no less a president than George Washington declined to bring the infant U.S. Republic into a war between France and other European powers in 1793 (6). To have done so could easily have brought about the destruction of the American nation. Proportionately the destruction in a global nuclear war would be no less complete. The umbrella offers no security.

Second, British or U.S. nuclear bases could be established in Australia. These have the double disadvantage of inflexibility and over-inclusiveness. For the weapons to be used, both parties must agree. If agreement involved the possible expansion of a local war into global nuclear war, it would probably not be forthcoming. On the other hand, a conflict in which Australia had only a marginal interest might become the occasion for a nuclear attack on Australia to knock out our foreign bases. Foreign bases increase our involvement unnecessarily.

Third, Australia might buy and install a complete system of deterrence. Such systems are currently not for sale, nor are they likely to come on the market even if the number of nuclear powers increases. No nation wishes to complicate its strategic planning by creating yet another nuclear power. Amity between buyer and seller is not unchangeable. Even if it were, the vendor power might well become involved in nuclear war through the adventurism of its friend.
Each of these unsatisfactory possibilities involves some kind of alliance. This points up a general proposition about international relations in a world in which nuclear weapons are widely dispersed. In such a world alliances are of highly questionable value as a means to national security. The possibility of mutual annihilation dictates that a nuclear power wishing to "get at" its opposite number will strike one of his smaller allies, to minimise the risk of global war. Conversely, small allies will seek success in their adventures by embroiling their great and powerful friends in involvements which, to them, are peripheral and often highly dangerous.

This peculiar property of the world of dispersed nuclear weapons serves notice on us all that we must scrap many familiar ways of thinking, and look afresh at the way we are to live in the world of nation states.

In the context of a policy of deterrence, this suggests a fourth possibility—that Australia develop its own independent deterrent. Burns (7) has scheduled and costed such a project. The cost for a complete system would be approximately $3,000 million spread over eleven years. This must be added to our present defence expenditure.

If we choose this course we can be certain that we will make the world in our own image. The threat of nuclear confrontation between China and Australia, that we fear, will certainly eventuate, if only as a reflex to the threat that we would constitute once we obtained nuclear weapons. Furthermore, other powers in our region who felt their security threatened, would take steps to improve their security, possibly by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. The result would be increasing polarisation in our region, and possibly further nuclear proliferation. Moreover, as a nuclear power, with inter-continental delivery capacity, Australia would constitute a potential threat to nations outside the region. We might therefore expect to become involved in unsought-for nuclear confrontations. Our own deterrent would have a tendency to over-inclusiveness.

In addition to these strategic problems, we would face problems in financing the development of the deterrence system. The cost is so great that it would cause a considerable slowing, if not cessation, of development on many domestic fronts. The sacrifices that this would require of the electorate would be forthcoming only in response to a considerable
propaganda campaign. In short, to finance our own nuclear deterrent an anti-communist scare of Macarthyist dimensions would be necessary. This could only heighten tension in the region and make our posture more inflexible. It would increase greatly the likelihood of war in our region.

But this is not all. The very act of adopting a nuclear deterrent would involve Australia in a confrontation extending far beyond nuclear weaponry with those nations whom we seek to deter. Our deterrent must remain credible. It must be protected from depreciation resulting from innovations in nuclear weaponry and defence, and innovations in other fields where technological developments could outflank or undermine nuclear weapons as effective deterrents. We would, then, be entering an innovation competition, in all fields relevant to defence, with those whom we would deter. In this Australia cannot hope to compete successfully in the long run with countries having the human and technological resources of, say, a developed China. In terms of appropriately trained scientific and technological personnel alone, the requirements for such an innovation competition far exceed our national capacity, both now, and in the foreseeable future.

Where, then, does this leave us? The threats we perceive are largely of our own imagining. Insofar as they are real, none are immediate or direct. Continuance of our present attitudes and posture will make them immediate and direct within twenty years.

Far from being adequate, Australia's present security system actually promotes, if it does not itself constitute, a grave threat to Australia's long-term security. It implies a future reliance by Australia on a nuclear deterrent. This will fail to provide adequate security for Australia, and will contribute appreciably towards decreasing the long-term security of mankind as a whole. We must then seek other means for promoting our security.

Creating Security for Australia

By what means is Australia to maintain her security? Our present path leads relentlessly towards the ever-receding mirage of security based on military means. We could give up the task as hopeless, and withdraw
into a kind of isolationism, ready, should danger threaten, to burrow echidna-like into the sand in the hope we may be overlooked. But this is a council of despair.

If Australia is to have security she must seek new ways to obtain it. We may set our sights low and aim for a mere avoidance of strife between Australia and other nations: Australia—the nation with the koala-bear countenance. Alternatively, we may set the goal higher and endeavour, while making ourselves secure, to make some contribution to the most pressing question facing human society—how to abolish war. Although international conflict will be with us for the foreseeable future, warfare must come to be regarded as an impossible means to use in settling conflicts. The possibility of war between any two nations must become as unlikely as between Australia and New Zealand.

Let us choose the higher of these goals and see what means we can discover to help us achieve it. New policies will be required, and our "tok bokis" must be enlarged. How can the condition of the Australian people be spoken to through this new, co-ordinated set of policies? It will help if we give it a name. We shall call it the "Fair Go Policy."

And what, fundamentally, does such a policy mean? Simply that the peculiarly Australian notion of a "fair go" should be extended from the domestic scene, both to govern Australia's relations with other nations, and, as far as possible, to govern relations between other nations as well. The emphasis here must be on showing active goodwill to all.

Easy to say, yet so difficult to achieve. Like charity, the Fair Go Policy begins at home, and it is with aspects of Australian domestic policy that we must begin.

Aborigine Advancement

For this audience, Aborigine advancement requires little discussion, since my immediate predecessor as James Backhouse Lecturer, Barrie Pittock, has considered the subject at length (8).
Constitutional responsibility for Aborigine advancement rests, since the 1967 referendum, with the Commonwealth. An adequate framework for Aborigine advancement requires Commonwealth legislation in four areas.

While basic rights and responsibilities should apply equally to all Australians, Aborigines as a community should be accorded special rights, for as long as is necessary, relating to education and development in particular, and comparable to those that have been accorded to ex-servicemen.

The titles to all reserves and tribal lands held by the Crown, together with the rights to minerals in that land, should be vested in the tribes or groups now occupying them.

Compensation for tribal lands expropriated since 1788 should be paid by the Commonwealth, the money being administered by an Aborigine Advancement Corporation set up as a statutory authority, with an Aboriginal chairman and majority on the board.

Aborigines should be represented both in the Senate, and in all relevant State Parliaments, by members of their own community. This would require the creation of special electorates and the granting of a second vote to Aborigines.

By extending a fair go to Aborigines we do more than merely confer benefits long overdue. Increasing identification between Aborigines and other Australians will facilitate identification between individual Australians and Asians as they meet, for friendships spanning different cultures will no longer seem strange. Furthermore, we will eliminate from our society a situation that could lessen our international security by damaging relationships between Australia and many non-Western nations.

Mass Media

If a Fair Go Policy is to succeed, the overall quality of Australian press, TV, and radio, which is not high by international standards, must improve considerably. Australians need to be much better informed on world affairs
and attitudes in other nations. Our sense of remoteness from the rest of the world, its troubles and its cares, must disappear. There must be more penetrating public criticism of particular domestic and foreign policies than is now commonly the case. Only as Australians come to understand better the world around them will they be able to take fully to heart a Fair Go Policy, appreciating both the relevance of particular courses of action and the needs that they are aimed to meet. Without such understanding the Policy will be a mere catch-cry, the content of which will remain the province of the experts, and liable to distortion by political processes.

Cultural Exchange and Travel

Although we live on the edge of Asia, with its long, rich, and varied cultural heritage, Australians have benefited little from its influence. How many Australians have seen an Indian film, or an Indonesian dance troupe? Just as we contribute to our neighbours' development through our aid programs, they may enrich our life if we receive frequent visits by cultural groups of various kinds.

Many Australians, not least young people, have both the money and time to travel overseas for short periods. Trips to Asia are yet scarcely in vogue; but could be encouraged by concession air fares and co-operative development of youth hostels in Asia.

Travel in the other direction is not so easy: money is limited, and many Asian nations face chronic foreign currency problems. Hut here again ways can be found. Youth hostels can be built. Cheap air fares could be provided. We bring migrants from Europe for $20 a head, why not Asian visitors also? British students spend their vacations here on working holidays. The same opportunity could be given to students of Asian universities and technical institutes.

The tourist potential of Asia is small, but increasing. We might run low cost tours under the theme "See the desert" - a landscape unknown in Southeast Asia, and therefore likely to create a lasting impression. In so doing we might incidentally bring home to Asians some limitations of our continent as a piece of real estate.
Immigration

We are acutely aware of the offence given to educated Asians and other non-Europeans by our Restrictive Immigration Policy, an offence that has been lessened but slightly by the recent liberalisation. A fair go here, as elsewhere, implies equal treatment of equals. Australia must adopt a policy that applies uniformly to all prospective immigrants. This policy should set up criteria on which all applicants would be judged, including such things as health, resources, education, skills, and adaptability to the Australian way of life.

By using these criteria, rather than nationality or race, flexibility is introduced into the selection process, which can become more inclusive as public attitudes change. A western-educated Indian, or Filipino, or Trinidadian might well have less difficulty in adjusting to life in Australia than do some Europeans. Admission rates would reflect such comparisons.

By such a policy Australia would have removed a source of dissension between itself and other nations, while avoiding the pitfalls of a quota system. Quotas, being numerical, have the habit of implying comparisons between nations. Such comparisons may become invidious and be used for propaganda purposes. The size of a quota, or its alteration, may become a bargaining point in negotiations over some quite different matter, thus complicating international questions unnecessarily.

Admission of Asian immigrants, who now form a smaller proportion of our population than for more than a century, would strengthen the bonds between Australia and Asian nations, increase our understanding of those nations, and provide a new ingredient in Australian cultural life. Australia would, in consequence, be both more secure and better fitted to play a constructive role in meeting the needs of the region.

National Development

The next thirty years will see an enormous growth in the demand for electric power in Australia. Already we are turning to nuclear energy to generate this power. During this period, advances in nuclear technology
will enable desalted sea water to be used economically for agriculture. Our concurrent need for water and power will accelerate our entry into nuclear power generation with two consequences.

The introduction of water into our semi-arid areas will increase our agricultural capacity. Already our agriculture is more efficient than Asia's-Australian rice paddies give the world's highest yield per acre. We can look to supplying Asia's food needs on a larger scale in the future.

Utilising nuclear power for desalination requires power stations in the 5000 Mw range. These will be of sophisticated design, and will be potential sources of raw material for nuclear weapons. If we are to avoid creating the suspicion that we are making these weapons on the quiet, we must make arrangements for international supervision of our nuclear power complex, as is envisaged under The Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. Security and national development interests alike demand that we should sign and ratify this treaty without delay.

Co-operative Development

In 1968 Australia devoted to the development of other countries $150 million (0.57% of her GNP) in the form of outright grants, of which two-thirds went to Papua-New Guinea. Privately sponsored voluntary contributions amounted in 1964 to $6.5 million (9) and have increased since then.

Conventionally this transfer of resources is termed "aid," a word that unfortunately suggests attitudes of "noblesse oblige" on the donor's part. Such attitudes no longer motivate domestic policy in modern states. The notion that each worker should individually bargain for his wage while the rich give to charities to provide for the poor is now regarded as archaic.

We have refurbished our thinking about domestic economic and social welfare policy. We must do likewise in the international sphere. As part of the Fair Go Policy the notion of aid would be replaced by a concept of co-operative development.
Co-operative development looks further than economic aid. It emphasises the essentially mutual nature of the activity. It can be bilateral or multilateral, and in either case all participants can and should both give and receive. Furthermore, co-operative development emphasises development, which of necessity requires planning, thus directing attention away from ad hoc projects and short-term hand-outs that make little lasting impact. Finally co-operative development is an integrative activity, drawing together the trade, foreign, and national security policies of each participating nation and orienting them towards the day when world order will replace international anarchy. In this respect it reflects the integrative intention of the Fair Go Policy as a whole.

Australia is a pioneer in one aspect of voluntary co-operative development, although few Australians realise it. In 1953, long before the U.S. adopted its Peace Corps, we had our Volunteer Graduate Scheme operating under a similar philosophy in Indonesia. From this has grown an enlarged programme, of worldwide outlook-Australian Volunteers Abroad, which has only recently attracted governmental financial support. The philosophy of the Volunteer Graduate Scheme is that young Australians should take jobs in Indonesia on the rates of pay obtaining locally, and live in the Indonesian community in the Indonesian manner. Such a scheme transforms aid from impersonal charity into an adventure in understanding between peoples.

Because of lack of governmental support, Australia has not made the most of its pioneering initiative in this field. Many more Australians could go overseas-not least among them those seeking more constructive alternatives than serving as conscripts in the army. It is difficult even now for highly qualified persons to participate, since they have already assumed domestic, financial, and professional responsibilities in Australia that could only be set aside at considerable personal cost. Methods for encouraging the participation of such people have been suggested, but public money would be needed for their implementation. There is room for considerable development in this field: a veritable Ambassadorate of the Fair Go!

Public money must be mobilised in other ways too. Our financial contribution to co-operative development should rise to 1% of the GNP as
rapidly as possible. Donations to privately sponsored funds should be made
tax deductible.

We must also reconsider our trade policies. As a major producer of
primary products for export, Australia should be especially sympathetic to
the problems that beset developing nations in the face of fluctuating world
commodity prices. As a nation accustomed to balance-of-payments crises,
we can appreciate the balance-of-payments difficulties experienced by
these nations. And, as a nation that is rapidly industrialising, and seeking to
sell its manufactures to the world, Australia can readily understand the
struggle developing nations face in securing markets for the products from
their infant industries.

Despite this, we are not noticeably generous in either our terms or
prices in our trade with other nations. Our eyes are on the material values of
the things we buy and sell, not on their social and human values to the
producers or recipients. These values should be acknowledged in the
international economic system, just as they are in the national system. We
have a Welfare State. What about initiatives for a Welfare World?

It is commonplace for rich nations to subsidise some segments of
their economies - as we do with our dairy industry, so as to make their
products competitive on the international market. It may be no less sensible
to subsidise the economy of developing countries by paying an artificially
high price for some of their products, thereby increasing their inflow of
foreign currency.

Papua - New Guinea

Far from being an albatross attracting to us the unwelcome attentions
of those who would export nationalist revolution, Papua-New Guinea is a
potential example of Australia's international intentions. If we are truly
sensitive to the aspirations of her people, and are prepared to back this
sensitivity with the necessary human and financial resources, we stand a
good chance of establishing in Papua-New Guinea a highly developed
example of how a fair go applies between nations. Our current policies are
inadequate to this endeavour.
For Papua-New Guinea, independence must be the goal. However, there is no need to rush this territory into independence. We can just as easily, and with more safety, give the parliament of Papua-New Guinea the power to declare itself independent in its own good time by its passing an act like our Statute of Westminster Adoption Act.

There should be no talk of terminating or cutting back financial assistance on independence, and much less talk about the country paying its own way-necessarily at a much lower standard of living than Australians enjoy. Rather we should guarantee continued substantial financial subventions from the Australian budget until such time as economic take-off is achieved. For living standards, the initial goal might be the territory-wide achievement of a standard comparable with that in civilised parts of Oceania.

*Foreign Policy - The United Nations*

Among the many important functions of the United Nations Organisation and its agencies is that of peacekeeping. This function has developed in a way not anticipated when the Charter was adopted. Peacekeeping has become primarily a General Assembly responsibility, carried out largely by forces from smaller nations - with some material support from great powers - and applied particularly to smaller powers that are in difficulties. The U.N.'s peacekeeping function is clearly relevant to Australia's security, for Australia is a small power.

The exercise of the peacekeeping function has brought a major financial crisis upon the U.N. Many nations, including two of the great powers, have refused to pay their contributions to peacekeeping operations, despite a ruling of the International Court that the levies were valid. Attempts to enforce the ruling of the International Court, by threatening defaulters with loss of voting rights, merely led to a crisis, and the virtual abandonment of the 19th U.N. Assembly, since loss of voting rights would have been followed by withdrawals and substantial loss of effectiveness by the organisation. The end result was to curb substantially the tendency of the General Assembly to take peacekeeping initiatives of the Gaza, Congo
or Cyprus type. This may have been the intention of some who supported moves to enforce the levies.

The veto renders the Security Council ineffective in peacekeeping. It is therefore important that the General Assembly's power to take the initiative be restored and enhanced. The alternatives are peacekeeping by great powers, of which Viet Nam is an example, attempts at peacekeeping by other less prestigious and effective international organisations as in Biafra, or no peacekeeping as in the Middle East.

As part of a Fair Go Policy, Australia should make massive contributions to U.N. peacekeeping funds. A figure of $50 million per annum, a mere 4% of our present defence budget, would not be too large.

This massive support for peacekeeping would be given as part of a broader programme put forward by Australia to make the U.N. an effective world peacekeeper. This programme might be looked on as a scheme for international insurance against war on the part of the smaller powers. All smaller powers would be encouraged to make contributions according to their means to the peacekeeping fund. If the great powers wished to assist also, well and good, but the primary responsibility would be with the smaller powers.

In the event of a smaller power being faced with a threat to its security it would "redeem its insurance policy" by invoking the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping force. With substantial annual contributions building up a reserve for emergencies, no financial impediment would exist to U.N. action.

For the U.N. to act, however, a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly would be required. The need to maintain this order of support in the international political community would exercise a moderating influence on the policies of many nations, for, if they alienated too many nations by their policies, they could find themselves unable to redeem their insurance policy should a threat to their security eventuate.

Equally, nations with an axe to grind would need to moderate their
policies, as they already do, in fact, lest they be faced with a two-thirds majority that would prevent their gaining any advantage at all.

All this is far removed from high principles of justice and truth. It sounds like what it in fact is - politics. Politics of just the sort that we are familiar with at home - sometimes grubby, often rather colourless in compromise, sometimes statesmanlike.

This may appal many people, to whom the U.N. is, or ought to be, a body governed in its deliberations by high-minded principles. When it is seen not to be so, such people give up hope of ever ending international anarchy. Yet this idealistic view of the U.N. is a myth, as Boyd (10) has so forcefully made plain. Why should we expect a political forum, the world's second attempt to end international anarchy, and as yet of uncertain staying power, to attain higher standards than obtain in our own national parliaments?

Those who see an end to international anarchy in the immediate and general acceptance of the rule of international law have forgotten their history. National law is enforceable throughout a nation only because the diverse groups in the nation tacitly agree that it shall be so. They agree because they are intimately involved in an integrative political process that holds the nation together, and they wish to remain so involved. It was not always so. England, for example, was the scene of varying degrees of anarchy for many centuries while the House of Commons gradually attained its supremacy. In this process, politics may be seen as the means for bringing the rule of law out of the anarchy of unrestrained power.

As with the House of Commons, so with the U.N. an evolutionary political process is at work. There are in fact many similarities of style and influence between the U.N. now and the House of Commons as it was under the early Stuart kings. A process of enlargement of powers, of increasing scope of interest, is going on in the U.N., with the Security Council and great powers cast in the role of the king and his cabinet.

This evolutionary process must be encouraged to continue and accelerate, for at the end of this road lies world government, of the
democratic kind. We can expect some shabby politics along the way, but better this than thermonuclear war.

It is integral to the Fair Go Policy that Australia devote its best efforts to the strengthening of the U.N., and enlarging its scope and powers. We could, for example, propose a Convention for the limitation of domestic jurisdiction. This would specify certain areas, e.g. race relations, which signatories undertook to regard as not exclusively matters of domestic concern. As more areas were added to the convention and more nations signed, the powers of the U.N. would be strengthened.

The power of the purse has already been an important factor in the U.N.'s development. It needs sources of revenue additional to national contributions. Already some Quakers tax themselves voluntarily and contribute the money to the U.N. Australia could be the first country to give the U.N. the right to tax its citizens directly. Even though the yield would be small by national standards the principle would be established and could extend subsequently to other nations.

The Antarctic Treaty could be modified to vest in the U.N. the rights to all natural resources in and about Antarctica. Again, the resources of the sea outside territorial waters, and those of the seabed exclusive of the continental shelves, could be vested in the U.N.

The ways to strengthen the U.N. are legion, and the Fair Go Policy should, in implementation, mark Australia out as the champion of a strong U.N., in the interests of world, and Australian, security.

*Foreign Relations*

The following general principles should govern our attitudes to other nations under the Fair Go Policy. Australia should show herself friendly to all nations regardless of their political systems. She should be willing to encourage peaceful national aspirations, and promote independence, stability and progress. Where we differ, we must be frank but not objectionable. Where we see disputes developing we must urge, by all
means open to us, their peaceful settlement, always being ready to run for the U.N. fire-bucket should violence break out.

These attitudes were embodied in our policy towards Indonesia in the 1940's. We are still drawing benefit from the capital which that policy laid up for us, despite all that has happened since.

And what of our current involvement in Viet Nam? U.S. involvement there has already been the subject of publications by American Quakers (5, 11), much of which is relevant to Australia's involvement.

There is, under a Fair Go Policy, only one satisfactory course of action open to Australia: withdrawal of our troops and complete liquidation of our military involvement with all possible speed, followed by massive support for reconstructing the Vietnamese economy. Of the many reasons for this, only four will be mentioned here.

First, our involvement in Viet Nam is not honourable, in the sense in which that term is usually applied to military involvements. The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference (July 21, 1954) states: "... the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political and territorial boundary." We are, then, intervening in a civil war, not a war in which one nation is attacking another. Furthermore this civil war, which started in 1946 as a war against French colonialism - a phase that ended at Geneva in 1954 - was renewed in 1957 as a result of the repudiation by the Diem regime in South Viet Nam of a key provision of the Geneva Declaration - the holding of elections in the South. Such elections, if held, would probably have resulted in re-unification of Viet Nam under Communist leadership. Our espousal of "freedom" in Viet Nam apparently does not extend to a popularly elected Communist government.

Second, as we have already noted, the nature of the regime that might control a reunified Viet Nam has no direct bearing on Australia's security. Nor has it been demonstrated to have any major significance for the security of most nations in Southeast Asia. The domino theory is an unreal assessment of the potentialities in the situation.
Third, in the long term, Australia's security is subject to a direct threat from Chinese nuclear weapons as a result of our involvement.

Finally, the Vietnamese people deserve a fair go. For them the Thirty Years War is rapidly becoming a present reality. Since 1941 they have been resisting Japanese, French, Chinese and U.S. interventions in their country, and have suffered devastation and continuous social disruption on a scale terrible to contemplate. One can only cry: Enough!

**Peace Research**

The academic discipline of peace research, embracing studies of international relations and conflict management among others, forms an essential element in any nuclear age foreign policy. The ultimate aim of peace research is to obtain a sufficient understanding of the way international conflict works to enable it to be managed without resort to violence \(^{(12, 13)}\). What Keynesian economics did for depressions, Peace Research seeks to do for war. As part of the Fair Go Policy Australia should establish a Peace Research Institute.

**Defence**

In the light of our testimony against all wars which extends back over 300 years, few Quakers would wish to encourage the retention of national armed forces. Such, however, would not be the view of the majority of Australians, and since Australia is a democracy, the majority view will prevail. Before seeing how the retention of military forces can be reconciled with the spirit of a Fair Go Policy, we should examine a possible alternative, while recognising that its acceptance by the Australian population at large is a much longer term proposition than the other proposals that are suggested here.

The alternative is that the Australian people be trained in the techniques of non-violent action and encouraged to adopt the attitudes necessary for is successful use.
No study has been made of the range of circumstances under which non-violent action can be effective - this is part of the task of peace research. History, however, provides several examples of non-violent resistance succeeding in difficult situations. Spontaneous non-violence was successfully used against the Nazis in Denmark and Norway during World War II. Its use by Gandhi in India is well known. It was also effective in Hungary in 1859-67, and to a more limited extent in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Non-violent action is not always successful. Victory may not come, and suffering may not be avoided. But modern war, either conventional or nuclear, also results in great suffering. Moreover the achievement of victory in any meaningful sense by warfare now seems impossible.

The general strategy of non-violent action (14) is to confront the oppressor personally with the wrongness of his actions in such a way that he sees their consequences. Because of this, non-violence is most effective when employed in a just cause. Ideally, the personal experience of the wrongdoer will lead him to recognise his true position. It produces a real change of heart and mind, rather than coercing the wrongdoer into submission. By it, enemies may be converted into friends.

Convincing the Australian people of the efficacy of non-violent action is likely to be no small task. A beginning can, however, be made immediately by giving Australian school-children an appreciation of the techniques and attitudes of non-violent action through a study of historical examples. Furthermore, the techniques of inter-person and inter-group conflict resolution could be taught, in place of the current emphasis on cadet corps.

Until such time as they are convinced of the efficacy of non-violent action, Australians will demand armed forces, and any government attempting to abolish armed forces would not last, at best, beyond the next election that it contested. What then is the place of armed forces in a Fair Go Policy?

Stress has already been laid on U.N. peacekeeping. In addition to finance, this requires personnel. As part of a Fair Go Policy our armed
forces would be remoulded and reoriented towards the role of peacekeeping. They would be renamed "Australian Contingent, U.N. Peacekeeping Force," and would be available on call for duty anywhere. Together with our financial contributions to peacekeeping they would provide the basis for a quid pro quo U.N. peacekeeping force to help Australia if she were faced with an international crisis of some kind.

The expressly non-offensive character of these armed services is consistent with the positive outlook inherent in the Fair Go Policy, while providing assurance to those Australians who doubt. Further, it gives a definitive lead to nations, such as Japan, that face problems regarding the future scope and nature of their armed forces.

Alliances

The dangers in military alliances in the nuclear age have already been discussed. Under the Fair Go Policy our military responsibilities to SEA TO and ANZAM would be terminated and replaced by guarantees within a broader U.N. context, for it is only within the context of U.N. Peacekeeping forces that small nations can now act internationally with both safety and honour.

The U.S. military establishments in Australia pose a more difficult problem, not least because we are uncertain of their role. If current speculations about their role are accurate, as seems likely, these establishments must, under a Fair Go Policy, be dismantled or internationalised. They certainly detract from our security, by tending to attract a direct nuclear threat. They are not known to make any direct contribution to our security. It is conceivable that, were the facts known, Australian political opinion would be far less favourably inclined towards their continued presence than at present.

The ANZUS treaty as presently interpreted is also not consistent with the Fair Go Policy. The alliance endangers us, and its guarantees are likely, in the final analysis, to be unredeemable. It could be terminated without endangering our security.
Nevertheless, the Australian public regards ANZUS as the rock on which our security is founded. Our friendship with the U.S. is of long standing, and the non-military ties that draw us together will not weaken. Termination or repudiation of ANZUS by an Australian government seems unlikely to be acceptable to the electorate in the foreseeable future. We must then accept the likely continuance of the alliance in some form, and seek to integrate it into the Fair Go Policy.

There is a strong element of idealism in American foreign policy, shown in U.S. initiatives towards forming the League of Nations and in her sponsorship of the U.N. and the Marshall Plan. Unfortunately, the U.S. can only rarely bring this idealism to bear satisfactorily because she is a great power. When any great power moves internationally it creates disturbance. Ideals and concrete interests get confused, propaganda claims are made by others, over-dark and overbright pictures are painted, supposed ulterior motives are discerned, and idealistic elements pass unnoticed.

Small powers are not so constrained, for their vested interests are fewer, and they are less likely to be involved in widespread and important propaganda exchanges. Significantly it was Canadian initiative, while an ally of the U.S., that led to the U.N. peacekeeping force being formed during the Suez crisis. And, significantly, small powers have been the major contributors of personnel to peacekeeping forces then and since.

As a small power, Australia is in an excellent position to take just those idealistically motivated initiatives that, while so dear to Americans, are denied to them. Indeed, this is an essential part of the Fair Go Policy.

Reconciliation of the ANZUS Treaty with the Fair Go Policy would seem to lie in negotiation with the U.S. of a publicly announced "understanding" as a gloss on the Treaty-amendment of the Treaty would not be necessary. This understanding would provide that our administrative and financial contribution to the partnership should comprise continuous and diligent pursuit of those constructive initiatives of a kind not open to the Americans, rather than support of military operations.
Epilogue

At this point we must end our consideration of the Fair Go Policy. Our task remains uncompleted. It can be completed only by the diligence of those Australians who hold dear the objectives of world brotherhood and order that the policy seeks to embody.

We must view the problem of security for Australia as part of a larger problem - that of security for mankind. This is the problem of our age, to which all men can make a contribution. Scientists may speak of preservation of the human species; humanists of human dignity, Christians of the Kingdom of God on earth. Nor are these mutually incompatible: each makes its contribution to the whole. And when the Quaker comes to make his contribution, he will, ere long, speak of peace. In the words of the Friends' Conference on World Order held in Indiana in 1961:

"Peace is God's will. Peace is Christ's way. This peace comes neither from surrender nor from war. Peace is love conquering fear. It is a lively concern for all men, for friend and for rival, for the lovely earth, for life and for joy. Peace is a shelter for all that we love. It is the only house in which man can now live. It is the Lord's power rising over all.

"Peace is world order and political institutions. It is justice and the control over the strong; it is mercy and the restraint of the merciless. It must be hoped for or we fall into irretrievable despair. It must be planned for, even on the brink of disaster, and even beyond disaster.

"To those of us who fear that an enemy will destroy us and what we love, to those who build shelters that will not shield, who trust armed might that has no power, and defence that cannot defend, we say there is power within man and beyond man, that can yet save us, and without which we cannot be moved. It is released by the fission of our hearts in repentance, and by the fusion of our minds in a common search for truth and justice. It can break out into the world even from a single person, who can start a chain reaction in those around him.
"Let us therefore turn finally and personally from our preoccupation with developing a capacity to kill, to discovering anew the capacity to change and to building world institutions which transcend nationalism and help identify us with all humanity as brothers in seeking to bring the fruits of peace to all men."
REFERENCES


(7) Australian Institute of International Affairs (1965), *Nuclear dispersal in Asia and the Indo-Pacific region*. Australian National University, Canberra.


