THE TWELFTH JAMES BACKHOUSE LECTURE 1976

IMPERIALISM WITHOUT INVADING ARMIES:

- peace, justice and the multinationals in Southeast Asia

STEWART & CHARLOTTE MEACHAM

What This Lecture is About

The U.S. military defeat in Indochina marks the end of an era in Southeast Asia in which Western economic powers (and Japan) have used their military forces directly to protect their economic system and interests as they have sought Southeast Asia's raw materials, and have developed markets, trade and investment opportunities for themselves.

In its place, already well developed, is a new imperialism, largely dissociated from the imperialism of invading armies and direct military intervention. Instead it relies on the power of economic structures, essentially the multinational corporations, to command the loyalty of the new elites in Southeast Asia and provide them with means to control their own populations when rival economic systems or visions of social justice become a threat.

The lecture discusses the compliance of Southeast Asian governments with this new imperialism in opening doors to Western multinationals, repressing domestic student, peasant, and worker discontent, and acceding to alliances amongst the new elites which supersede the traditional allegiance owed to nation-states. The threat of nuclear war and the blight of racism are seen as continuing and growing anomalies in the new situation. The economic internationalism of this new imperialism impoverishes and fragments the masses of the people as the rich get richer, and the poor poorer.

The lecture closes with no panacea but with a plea for people-oriented research, for the publication of the truth about the new imperialism, and for action at the grass-roots relevant to the needs of people for justice, freedom and power.

About the Authors

From 1971-75 Stewart and Charlotte Meacham were senior staff at the Quaker International Seminars Program in Singapore. During that period they travelled widely in Southeast Asia. Charlotte is a community organisation worker with much experience of racial situations in the United States of America; she visited Australia in 1972 specially to meet with Aborigines and advise on how they and white Australians could work together to better the conditions in which Aborigines live. Stewart Meacham worked in labour relations (including the National Labor Relations Board and the US Department of Labor 1937-48) before joining the American Friends Service Committee in 1957 where he was National Peace Education Secretary from 1960 until 1971.

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THE JAMES BACKHOUSE LECTURES

This is the twelfth in a series of lectures instituted by Australia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends on the occasion of the establishment of that Yearly Meeting on 1 January 1964.

This lecture was delivered at the Clevedon Conference Centre, Victoria on 4 January 1976 at the time of the holding of Yearly Meeting.

James Backhouse was an English Friend who visited Australia from 1832 to 1838. He and his companion, George Washington Walker, travelled widely but spent most of their time in Tasmania.

It was through this visit that Quaker Meetings were first established in Australia. James Backhouse was a botanist who published full accounts of what he saw, besides encouraging Friends and following up his deep concern for the convicts and for the welfare of the Aboriginal inhabitants of the country.

Australian Friends hope that this series of lectures will bring fresh insights into truth, often with some reference to the needs and aspirations of Australian Quakerism.

MARGARET F. ROBERTS, Presiding Clerk Australia Yearly Meeting

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IMPERIALISM WITHOUT INVADING ARMIES:

- peace, justice and the multinationals in Southeast Asia

During the past four years the power assumptions of American policy in Asia have been proved wrong, the military undertakings based on those assumptions have been defeated and an American President has resigned in disgrace for offences committed in an effort to salvage something from the wreckage he and his predecessors had brought on.

The Defeat of Western Military Power in Asia

Thirty years ago the United States emerged from World War II as the leading military and economic power of the Western world. American influence was world-wide and its commitments had the support and involvement of most of the countries of Western Europe and of Japan. and many of the governments of the emerging Third World. Wendell Wilkie spoke of America's unprecedented reservoir of goodwill as a country which stood for democracy and a strong United Nations. This strongly appealed to the governments of the newly independent countries in the Asian region where the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were incorporated into many of the Constitutions.

During the succeeding years Friends have been very much involved in social struggles that have characterized the period. Quakers have been a part of the peace, anti-nuclear weapons, and anti-war movements in Europe. in the United States, in Japan, and in Australia and New Zealand. We have entered into the struggles of minority and exploited people for justice, freedom, and equality whether it has been the black people of North America, the Aborigines of Australia, or the more recent and more complex movement of liberation of women. The interest and participation of Friends in these events and efforts has not been arm-chair. We have not been observers viewing wars, revolutions, and liberation struggles from a distance. We have sought to find the way to participate as Friends in the events of our times. And often we have been successful.

The changes that have occurred are sweeping and basic. For more than twenty years American policy has assumed that military power is essential to protect the economic system of the West, that without American military containment of communism the worker-peasant revolution that had triumphed in China would spread through the rest of Asia, that if this occurred Western capital and Western technology would have no access or power in the markets and in the industrial development of Southeast and South Asia, that without such access and

especially the power to extract essential raw materials, the pre-eminence of the economic system of the West based on private ownership of the means of production, free trade, profit margins, and capital investment would atrophy and come to an end.

Because of those assumptions an alliance was built to contain communism. Where communism had come into power it would be driven back; where it could not be driven back or out it would be isolated; and wherever incipient leftist movements appeared and threatened to spread they would be crushed.

The methods developed to further those ends have included everything from vast development and assistance projects to nuclear weapons proliferation; there have been organized assassination campaigns, international cooperative systems for training and coordinating police forces, subversion through the use of secret agents, and the use of the resources of trade unions, businesses, universities, and private foundations to frustrate popular movements and to maintain in power those Asian leaders who could be trusted to serve Western interests.

The end result of these efforts in Southeast Asia has been devastating for those who launched them in the first place, and particularly the last four Presidents who pursued these policies. Within the last four years we have seen China, for the containment of which we were fighting a vicious and seemingly endless war in Vietnam, admitted to the United Nations over the angry opposition of the United States and with the ecstatic support of representatives of the Third World countries, many of which were themselves the recipients of grants-in-aid designed to keep them from going communist. We have seen a President who had had a long career in ideological anti-communism, both in domestic affairs and in foreign policy, flying to Peking to shake hands with Chairman Mao and Mr. Chou En-lai. Later he himself resigned his office to escape impeachment and criminal charges for excesses committed to protect himself in the face of widespread opposition. And finally, less than a year later, we have seen the final and total defeat of all that the United States and its Western alliance could do to crush the struggles of the Vietnamese, the Cambodians, and the Lao to liberate themselves from American dominance.

There is no need for us as Friends to live in the past and try to catalogue the things we did and the part we played in this situation. We were a part of a larger movement, and we tried to bring to it whatever strength we could as Friends. We shared the wide and growing sense of moral outrage at what was going on in

Indochina. We were not prepared to accept that such excesses were essential to preserve freedom and democracy, particularly considering the fact that the regimes we supported in Indochina ruthlessly violated the freedom and democracy of the people of Indochina. We could not believe in ends which required gross and murderous means. That is a part of what we have been and what we are, - and our only real regret must be that it took so long to bring the excesses to an end.

At the same time we cannot assume that Southeast Asia will now be free of materialism and imperialism from the West, nor that there will be no moral responsibilities laid upon us as Friends in the new situation. Indeed, we should assess the situation emerging in Southeast Asia and see what our responsibilities are.

Assessment of the Western Military Defeat

Perhaps as good a way as any to start the assessment would be to see what the reactions are of the countries most directly and closely affected by the Western military defeat. These, as, we see it, include:

- 1. the ASEAN* Countries, i.e. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines;
- 2. the United States itself; and.
- 3. China and the Soviet Union.

[* Association of South East Asian Nations]

Of course the Indochina countries also are very directly and closely affected but we feel unable as outsiders at this time to assess their priorities. The dust will have to settle there before much can be said with certainty.

But some things do seem to be clear so far as the ASEAN governments are concerned. No longer can they live comfortably under the U.S. military umbrella while a nearby neighbour is being ravaged. The umbrella is no longer there. They face a new set of demands:

- 1. They must normalize their relations with China.
- 2. They must normalize their relations with the countries of Indochina.
- 3. They must re-assess their external security needs and consider how best to meet them.

- 4. They must re-assess their internal political and security needs and consider how best to meet them.
- 5. And, they must retain and even improve their integration with Western financial resources and networks, and with the multinational corporations.

Obviously, these necessities do not all seem to be in political harmony with each other, but the art of politics is to develop harmony out of out-moded conflict, and with the defeat of its military forces and resources in Indochina the type of conflict the United States has waged there is definitely out-moded.

So long as China was being contained or appeared to be contained by the Indochina War, the ASEAN governments did not need worry about normal relations with China or Vietnam. But now that China is playing a role on the world scene the situation is different. And Vietnam's victory 'has raised fear in the minds of ASEAN governments. What will be the effects on domestic insurgents, especially in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia? And what will be the effect on the radicals and the deprived in other parts of Southeast Asia such as Singapore and Indonesia? These fears are not groundless. Even amongst middleclass Southeast Asians, and especially the overseas Chinese, there is a deep sense of pride in China's victory, and they see the connection between it and Vietnam. As Chinese and as Asians they feel that China's victory over the West is also their victory. The ASEAN government authorities are well aware of these feelings and have reacted accordingly. While moving in the direction of normalized relations with the communist countries they have at the same time tightened up their domestic controls. People-to-people contacts with China are discouraged. Government critics are sent to prison without trial. Martial law in the Philippines which was proclaimed only shortly after the Nixon visit to Peking was in part a response to that visit. Arrests and trials of out-spoken intellectual critics of conditions and government policies in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are all a part of the same repressive reaction.

Diplomatic relations with China and Vietnam are being considered by some and already have been established by others of the ASEAN group, but all insist that there must be clear commitments by the communist countries that they will give no support to local insurgent movements or to ASEAN domestic radicals.

It is interesting that both China and the Vietnamese have given such assurances, but it is not yet clear from the somewhat ambiguous language used what the assurances really mean. At least the rhetoric is a departure from the

solidarity slogans of recent revolutionary struggle. Whether it is an indication that liberation movements tend to be somewhat less revolutionary when they must exercise power rather than seize it remains to be seen. Certainly it suggests a commitment to give orderly processes a chance to work.

At the same time, from at least some of the ASEAN governments, after the defeat in Vietnam there was talk of how the real bulwark against communist insurgency is social justice. But thus far this has been defined (and carefully confined) in terms of government-sponsored and controlled programs.

The ASEAN reaction to the defeat of U.S. military power thus is ambivalent. They are now ready to make a virtue out of necessity and enter into diplomatic relations with their communist neighbors, but this does not mean a reorientation of their internal and domestic structures along lines of worker-peasants-peoples movements. Just the opposite. In all ASEAN countries anything and everything done or said by students, farmers, workers, or ethnic groups that seems to lean toward a socialist re-ordering of society, toward overt identification with China on ideological grounds, or toward public protest or persistent criticism, is suppressed and its leaders are sent to prison without trial for indeterminate periods of time, running into years. This combination of diplomatic rapprochement and domestic toughness is the new ASEAN realism.

And at the same time these countries are more eager than ever to strengthen ties with Western, and especially American and Japanese, business and financial interests. The power of the American military may now be seen as reduced and remote but that does not apply to the power and the influence of American corporations, American technocrats, American banks, and American dominated international agencies such as the World Bank and its adjuncts. And the same can be said for the counterpart European and Japanese corporate structures.

Gunboat Diplomacy - The New American Fantasy

The reaction of the United States, on the other hand, to the American military defeat seems to be of quite a different order, and is in many ways out of phase with the more realistic and sober reactions of its ASEAN friends. One senses that the American Congress has come closer to accepting the realities of the defeat than has the Administration, - and especially the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defence. They are turning old American realities into new American fantasies and are projecting gunboat diplomacy into the future. The Mayaguez incident off Cambodia was an example of this. They

proclaimed it as proof that the United States is still a military power in Southeast Asia, but their widely publicized glee over that incident was evidence of just the opposite. Men confident of power would have had more convincing things to be happy about. Their lag in accepting reality and coming to terms with it can be quite dangerous as witness the recent suggestions of Kissinger and Schlesinger that the United States might use its armed forces in the Middle East oil countries to protect U.S. access to oil, or that it might resort to nuclear weapons if Park's government in South Korea were to be attacked. Let us hope that soberer and more realistic judgements will soon emerge.

Detente and Deterrence

Turning to the reactions of China and the Soviet Union) to the defeat of the United States military power in Southeast Asia they seem less ecstatic than some may have expected, particularly if we have the notion that countries, because they are Marxist, are not strongly influenced by considerations that have little or nothing to do with class struggle. The one thing that China and the Soviet Union seem to be together on is that each seems to welcome continued American military presence in Southeast Asia. China sees it as a counter-force to the Soviet Union, while the USSR/US detente has as one of its dimensions a mutual build up of air and sea power in the Indian Ocean with each using the presence of the other as an excuse for its own enlargement of presence there.

These accommodations to continued American armed force in this part of the world by each of the two great communist powers can only mean that neither has the slightest notion that that force will be used against it. Indeed China seems to feel more secure with the U.S. on the scene rather than less.

When we recall the reports of secret discussions between the American and Soviet military in the early and mid-fifties about how to deal with the fact that China was developing its own missile and nuclear capacity, and the rumours that the nuclear destruction of China's nuclear weapons building facilities was actually considered by the United States (and possibly by both), we realize how much the world of military force and counter-force can shift and change. Today neither China nor the USSR thinks that the U.S. Navy and Air Force in Asia will lead to U.S. arms being used against it; each thinks that such arrangements can be useful to it in the future. This is something new in the world of ideological conflict and nuclear threat and counter-threat.

The evident build-up of both Soviet and Chinese navies is intriguing. China's is now reputed to be the third largest in the world. Does this relate to Diego Garcia? The oil needs of Japan? The struggle for control of the sea-bed? Or to a bit of each?

Meanwhile Australia and New Zealand call for the Indian Ocean to become a "zone of peace".

Thus we see in Southeast Asia in the post-defeat situation of the American forces in Vietnam a new realism on the part of the ASEAN countries, and shifts in both foreign and domestic policies to meet the situation; we see indications from the American side that it is engaging in fantasies and believes that it can revert to the past reliance on military power, and in those terms retain the role of arbiter of power in Asia; and we see China and the Soviet Union no longer fearful of American military power but relating to it in ways that seem to allay the fears of one and enhance the ambitions of the other with respect to their rivalry and suspicion of each other.

At the same time neither do the ASEAN governments which remain emotionally and ideologically deeply anti-communist, believe that American military power offers them much protection; nor do the two great communist powers, China and the Soviet Union, each of which sees itself as the exponent of the true faith, see American military power as much of a threat. This suggests, if they are right, a new, unprecedented, and startling situation. In other wars which have ended not by truce or stalemate but by one side defeating the other, the defeated force has been shattered and decimated. This is not the case here. Though completely defeated the American armed forces are, as a military machine, unimpaired. Losses incurred during the war were more than replaced. New and often more effective types of weapons were introduced in quantity throughout the war. Nevertheless in an age of air power the mightiest air force was defeated by an army and a people with no planes. The larger and better armed ground force was defeated by the smaller and more lightly armed ground force. A country with an extended and only thinly defended coast-line won out over a country with massive sea power which was massively used. The dilemma of American armed forces in Southeast Asia, as a result, is that though it withdrew from Vietnam virtually unscathed, there is no place now in Southeast Asia where it can fire a shot. As an element in the Southeast Asian power situation American military power has become an irrelevance. How long this situation will last none can say. When pacifists begin proclaiming the demise of the relevance of the military it is time to display caution and constraint. There is enough wishful thinking going on on the side of the Pentagon without us joining in. But neither should we be blind to reality especially if it is reality which the militarists are trying to shut out of their minds, hoping it will go away.

The New Non-military Western Imperialism

None of which means that American and Western influence and power in Southeast Asia has come to an end. Far from it. What it does mean is that that influence and power can no longer be basically or predominantly military. It is non-military. Yet it is still very great. It is the power to extract oil, to dig mines, to cut timber, to build factories, to hire people, to train them how to work, to own, to sell, to make profits, and to use the profits to buy and to build new factories, mines and oil wells. It is the power to introduce new technology and to reshape the lives of entire nations of people. And to do it all under the guise of developing the under-developed nations, and in the name of "aid".

President Eisenhower in his last address to the American people at the end of his second term as President spoke with a note of warning about what he called the military-industrial complex. He said that it threatened to usurp the capacities of the American people to control the power decisions made in their name. Today the military aspect of this complex, at least in Southeast Asia, is confronted with its own irrelevance but the industrial aspect is thriving. Its most dramatic expression is to be found in what have come to be called the multinational corporations. These may be American, they may be Japanese, or they may be from Western Europe. Ever since World War II the multinationals have been pouring into Southeast Asia, especially from the United States, and increasingly from Japan.

The Older Western Imperialism

These are not a new phenomenon for they have roots going back to the colonial period and even earlier roots that have had religious as well as economic sanction. In Australia a rapid rise in Chinese worker immigrants, both indentured and unindentured, in the mid19th century generated Yellow Peril fears, anti-Chinese riots, and the formation of Anti-Chinese Leagues. Chinese exclusion became a popular political issue, stimulated in part by exclusion measures adopted in the States. Some thought these would result in more Chinese being diverted to Australia. By 1901 the political climate was ripe for broad and inclusive restrictive measures which persisted without serious modification through the first half of the Twentieth Century.

At this same time when Asians were being kept out of the United States and Australia, commercial and religious interests from the West were pressing into Asia. In 1841 the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions reported regarding the Opium War in China that "this was not so much an opium or an English affair as the result of a great design of Providence to make the wickedness of men sub serve his purposes of mercy toward China, in breaking through her wall of exclusion, and bringing the empire into more immediate contact with Western and Christian nations." ² John Quincy Adams in a lecture on the Opium War explained how China's trade policy was contrary to the law of nature and Christian principles. He said: "The moral obligation of commercial intercourse between nations is founded entirely, exclusively upon the Christian precept to love your neighbor as yourself. . . But China, not being a Christian nation, its inhabitants do not consider themselves bound by the Christian precept, to love their neighbor as themselves. . . This is a churlish and unsocial system. . . The fundamental principle of the Chinese Empire is anti-commercial . . . It admits no obligation to hold commercial intercourse with others. It is time that this enormous outrage upon the rights of human nature, and upon the first principles of the rights of nations should cease." ³

The linking of morality and international trade and investment, and of both to national security and national interest has been characteristic of the American foreign policy through the years. A U.S. Navy bulletin in 1922 was titled "The U.S. Navy as an Industrial Asset" and described the Navy's role in protecting and opening up commercial and investment opportunities for American business, ⁴ and more recently Eugene R. Black, formerly president and chairman of the World Bank has said "Our foreign aid programs constitute a distinct benefit to American business. The three major benefits are:

- 1. Foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate market for U.S. goods and services.
- 2. Foreign aid stimulates the development of new overseas markets for U.S. companies.
- 3. Foreign aid orients national economies toward a free enterprise system in which U.S. firms can prosper." ⁵

Thus it provides raw materials, it creates markets, and it maintains the system. What more could human benevolence ask for?

As the protective and sanctioning association of American business with American military aggression and American religious imperialism developed in Asia, the business aspects of the relationship became stronger even as the religious, and now the military, aspects have been of less importance. Gunboat diplomacy is no longer acceptable in the Third World and neither is salvation evangelism tied to the disciplines of aggressive capitalism, though at times there seem to be reversions at least to the gunboat mentality, as in the Mayaguez incident and the threats of U.S. military action over Middle East oil. But Asia has come a long way in the fifty years since the mid-I920s when the U.S. Navv could announce that "in the Asiatic area a force of gunboats is kept on constant patrol in the Yangtse River. These boats are able to patrol from the mouth of the river up nearly 2,000 miles into the very heart of China. American businessmen have freely stated that should the United States withdraw this patrol they would have to leave at the same time. Our Navy not only protects our own citizens and their property, but is constantly protecting humanity in general and frequently actually engages the bands of bandits who infest this region." 6 As a matter of fact Asia has come a long way even since John Foster Dulles could point to the mineral wealth of Indochina as a justification for refusing to sign the Geneva Accords on Indochina in 1954 which President Eisenhower later acknowledged would have led to victory at the polls for President Ho Chi Minh had the United States not manoeuvred Diem into power in Saigon and used him to block the elections which had been agreed to. And even as recently as 1966 a Vice-President of the First National City Bank linked American business imperialism to American military imperialism when he said regarding Vietnam, "We believe that we're going to win this war. Afterwards you'll have a major job of reconstruction on your hands. That will take financing and financing means banks. . . It would be illogical to permit the English and French to monopolize the banking business because South Vietnam's economy is becoming more and more United States oriented." Asia has come a long way. All of which means that the multinational corporations which have proliferated throughout Southeast Asia during the period of U.S. military aggression in Vietnam now must face the task of retaining their place in Asia without the blessings of the Missionary Societies nor the guns of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to protect them and their system from bandits, terrorists, communists, farmers, workers, or even the elites of the countries where they invest money, hire workers, build factories, sell products, and make profits. Is it reasonable to suppose that they will be successful? What is the nature of their power? What are the effects of their operations? What relations do they generate in the countries where they take root? Can they survive in the period of post-gunboat and post-B52 diplomacy? Can they make it on their own with neither God nor guns to validate their right of access and tenure?

The New Imperialism - Western Multinational Corporate Power

What is the nature and the size of this new international complex of non-military power which has emerged from the Western corporate structures and methods, and which has been a pre-occupation of the Australian Labor Government as well as of many concerned intellectuals, students and social critics in the countries of Asia still not in control of their own resources? We would like to quote a few descriptive paragraphs about the multinationals from a recent book, *Global Reach*, by Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington D.C. They say:

"The men who run modern international corporations are the first in history with the organization, the technology, the money, and the ideology to make a credible try at managing the world as an integrated unit. . . George Ball, Under-Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Administrations and now a partner in the international investment-banking firm of Lehman Brothers, has said, 'Working through the great corporations that straddle the earth, men are able for the first time to utilize world resources with an efficiency dictated by the objective logic of profit'.... .The rise of the global enterprise is producing an organizational revolution as profound in its implications for modern man as the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the nation-state. Within the last ten years, global corporations have grown so fast that their combined total sales exceed the gross national product of every country except the United States and the Soviet Union. With more than two hundred billion dollars in physical assets under their control, the international corporations average growth rate since 1950 has been two or three times greater than the growth rate of most advanced industrial countries, including the United States. In 1971, General Motors, one of the giants of them all had gross annual sales of twenty-eight billion dollars; Switzerland's gross national product was twenty-six billion. By making ordinary business decisions the managers of firms like G.M., I.B.M., General Electric, and Exxon now have more power than most sovereign governments to determine where people will live; what work they will do, if any; what they will eat, drink, and wear; what sorts of knowledge schools and universities will encourage; and what kind of society their children will inherit. Indeed the most revolutionary aspect of the giant international corporations is not their size but their world view. Their managers. . . are demanding in essence the right to transcend the nation-state and, in the process, to transform it. 'I have long dreamed of buying an island owned by no nation and of establishing the World Headquarters of the Dow Company on the truly neutral ground of such an island, beholden to no nation or society,' Carl Gerstacker the chairman of the Dow Chemical Company said in 1972, at the White House Conference on the Industrial World Ahead. And Charles Kindleberger, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the leading American authorities on international economics, comments, 'The international corporation has no country to which it owes more loyalty than any other, nor any country where it feels completely at home.' " 8

With the defeat of the American military in Indochina and with the victory of communist governments in Indochina, the question the ASEAN countries face, and the multinational corporate structures within those countries face, is whether the capitalistic economic system as exemplified by the multinational corporations and as nurtured and practiced by the ASEAN countries can survive in Southeast Asia. Up until now it has been conventional wisdom to say that it could not survive without the shield of military might. This has been believed on both sides of the ideological barricades. But life is stranger than theory as the Soviet/Sino split has demonstrated; and there is reason to believe that the multinational corporate structures and the political powers and governments which invite them in may not be approaching their end in Southeast Asia after all despite the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. The multinationals have resources and power which suggest considerable survival capacity.

Inherent Survival Capacities

First, there is the inherent power of the multinational corporation structures themselves as structures. Retired General J. Lawton Collins, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Charles Pfizer & Co., explained that company's world structure in this way:

"Because organization is an important problem, I will review briefly the system by which Pfizer, a pharmaceutical and fine chemicals company, controls investment abroad. Pfizer is incorporated in Panama and operates through subsidiaries and branches in at least 50 countries. The greatest problem is how to control such a widespread organization.

"The system is very similar to a military one. There are nine regional managers who have general authority over country company managers. Both authority and responsibility are to a large extent decentralized. Centralized control is maintained through the board of directors of Pfizer

International in New York, a purely management subsidiary of the Panamanian parent corporation.

"Control is exerted through the budget. Country budgets art: submitted by the country managers, reviewed by the regional managers, and reviewed for final approval by Pfizer International. Once a budget is approved, a country manager is on his own".

"For running control through the year, it has been necessary to establish a unified accounting system. For this purpose the rules of a Pfizer accounting manual are followed rigidly. There are also standard operating procedures. A procedures manual delineates broad policies, which the country managers are supposed to follow in a general, not a rigid', manner." ⁹

As General Collins says, the structure is very similar to a military one, and it is able to exercise similar power over people. Those who live and work within it must plan their lives to suit the company's decisions, which are enforced through a system of budgetary controls running from the pay-check a worker gets in anyone of fifty countries all the way to the central control office in New York, following an accounting manual which must be rigidly followed.

One difference between Pfizer and the military is that there is no clear authority above Pfizer, not anywhere. Its central control office is located in New York, but that office is itself a subsidiary of a home office located in Panama. The Panama parent corporation is a convenient fiction which symbolizes the absence of any central governmental control over the extended international operations of Pfizer or any of the multinationals. They are responsible only to themselves. They survive by accommodating to whatever legal situation exists where they find it profitable to operate, and the only test of whether they will be located at one place or another is the test of profit-making opportunity. They have enormous -power to shape the lives of the people who work for them, to enhance the status and the prestige of their managerial staff, to influence and even modify the social norms and the moral assumptions of the existing arbiters of propriety and community practice where they operate, and to shape the laws and the policies of governments so as to enhance the corporate access to low wages, compliant workers, freedom from public criticism, tax concessions, duty-free zones, attractive investment opportunities and the freedom to take profits made in one country out of that country and use them somewhere else.

To a very considerable extent the multi-nationals today are successfully operating in Southeast Asia and particularly in the ASEAN countries, exercising all of these powers most effectively and profitably. They are doing this on their

own and as a result of the attractions they hold out to governments and local elites and there is no discernible connection between their success and the intervention or presence of outside armed force. The historical connection is there as we have seen, running back into the blatancy and the candor of the older imperialism. But with the new imperialism of the multinational corporations and their supporting institutions, their own inherent power is much greater than was true of their commercial fore-runners in the past, and their willingness to be considered an adjunct to external military intrusion is much less. They neither want it nor need it. They can maintain themselves for the indefinite future relying on their own inherent power of structure and alliance with Third World governments and elites, rather than relying on military intervention from the outside.

The Relevance of Corporate Power Contrasted with Military Power in Southeast Asia.

The question is essentially a question of power. Certainly the power the multinationals are able to generate, if it were attempted by outside military force would turn even the most cooperative people in power in Southeast Asia today into heroic resisters. There is no place now in this part of the world where a foreign army can openly come in and tell people what time of day or night they must work, under what conditions, and at what pay scales. Nor can it come and tell people to move from land they long have worked and lived on and go to some other place, and, if they seem reluctant, have them thrown out by the local authorities or have their houses burned. Nor is there a country here where a foreign army could have the government rewrite its laws and revise its policies to assure that critics of the occupying army will be thrown into jail, denied opportunities for education, or driven underground. This kind of thing was possible and indeed has been characteristic of past imperialism in Southeast Asia. It characterized Dutch rule in Indonesia, British rule in Malaysia and Singapore, French rule in Indochina, and U.S. rule in the Philippines. It characterized the Japanese occupation of all of those areas plus Thailand in the early 1940s. But there is no present indication that American or any other kind of foreign military force can move in and ever do that kind of thing in Southeast Asia again, though there is considerable indication that the multinational corporations can move in and enjoy just this kind of authority. In fact, that is what is happening.

Corporate Control of People

In the Philippines, even before martial law, we once visited a village where some houses had been burned to the ground by outsiders. It was a village in Mindanao, made up of people who had lived along the slopes of Mount Apo, and had moved about carrying on their traditional agriculture for generations, never challenged as to their access to the land, and by tradition, claiming it as theirs. The villagers told us that their houses had been burned by inmates of a near-by prison camp, a very large one, operated as an example of modern penology. The inmates were permitted to leave the prison itself and to work outside in the surrounding community. Some were even allowed to marry local women. Friends who had brought us to the village and had arranged for us to talk with the people explained that a large international corporation wanted to use some 2,000 hectares of land for a banana plantation. The government had granted them a long term lease on the land that they wanted, and it was land on which the villagers we met lived. The agro-industry which was planning the plantation wanted to get the villagers off of the land because it felt that they would not be desirable as day laborers. The villagers were accustomed to making their own decisions about their own work schedules, and it would be difficult to get them to accept the company's work rules and management. Prison inmates would be much preferred because if they were working for the company and caused difficulty the company literally could send them back to jail. But the problem was how to get the villagers off the land? The government had given the multinational company a lease but it was possible that the villagers could go into court and challenge efforts to throw them off of the land. A simpler way was harrassment, and the burning of their huts was a part of that with prisoners, prison authorities, and the multinational officials in cahoots. The farmers organization which sponsored our visit to this village and which was planning court action was itself, not many months later, forced out of existence by martial law.

In most ASEAN countries trade unions either are not allowed to exist or else their existence is circumscribed; they function as instruments of official policy, particularly where the multinationals are concerned. In Malaysia and in Singapore, multinational companies are placed in the Pioneer Industry category and for the first five years (this is now being extended to ten years) they are allowed tax-free operation and are protected from wage increase demands. Protection from increased wage demands in Singapore is guaranteed through the Pioneer Industry Employees Union which has exclusive rights to represent workers in the Pioneer Industries. Wage demands or other demands upon employers in this category cannot be made by or on behalf of employees except

through the PIEU. And it thus far has not been known to press such demands. In Malaysia the matter is handled in a less complicated way. Workers are simply denied by law the right to join unions or bargain collectively for higher wages if they are working for a pioneer industry.

A recent widely publicized crack-down by the Singapore authorities on workers and students who were trying to force the PIEU to intervene with a multinational Pioneer Industry employer, The American Marine Co., on behalf of workers whom it had laid off resulted in the trial and conviction of a student leader and two workers for rioting, and the expulsion from Singapore of three other student leaders while a fourth went underground. One of those expelled to Malaysia, Juliet Chin, is now being held there under Malaysia's Internal Security Act. During the trial of the student leader in Singapore, Tan Wah Piow, and the two workers from American Marine, Ng Wah Ling and Yap Kim Hong, the defence claimed that the charges of rioting by the three actually were a frame up, and were based on destruction of furniture in the PIEU office by the PIEU officials themselves behind locked doors. There was testimony that the three accused were outside the PIEU office and some distance away while sounds of furniture being smashed inside could be heard by workers outside the union offices.

Doubtless Friends in Australia are aware of this trial as it became a matter of considerable interest, alarm, and protest here in Australia where many Malaysian and Singaporean students shared information of what was occurring with their Australian friends. When Ian MacDonald, President of the Australian Union of Students attempted to visit the court area in Singapore and make contact with students at the beginning of the trial, he was quickly sent out of the country.

In our own case we were able to discover no one who did not believe that the charges of rioting were false, that none of the three had anything to do with the breaking of the union office furniture, and that the prosecution of students involved a conscious frame-up to intimidate others who might intervene on behalf of workers laid off by a pioneer multinational corporation, or were in other ways critical of Singapore multinationals. One of the specific things the students had done in this instance was to set up a Retrenchment Research Center to study and to publicize the facts regarding the lay-off of Singapore workers by multinational corporations.

In one instance, while the trial of Wah Piow was still in progress, we were at a dinner party. One of the other guests was a Singapore banker, a Chinese

branch manager of one of Singapore's largest Chinese banks. One of us, in the course of a conversation, asked him what he thought of the student action that was involved in the events leading up to the trial. The banker replied, "I don't think those students know enough to try to tell the Singapore government how to run Singapore". and then, with scarcely a pause he added, "But the government should not frame up charges against the students. That makes people lose confidence".

Basically of course, the issue we are concerned with here is not only whether Wah Piow was framed but also whether PIEU wanted to protect the workers or protect the American Marine Company. Perhaps we can judge from PIED's actions. It succeeded in sending two workers and a student leader to jail, but it made no demands whatever on the American Marine Company.

Juliet Chin, a young Malaysian woman, and a student at the University of Singapore at the time, an active leader of the University of Singapore Student Union, was picked up by Singapore police and whisked across the Causeway into Malaysia in the early hours of the morning on the very day Wah Piow's trial was to begin. She was slated to be a key witness in Wah Piow's defense. As soon as she reached Malaysia she was arrested by the Malaysia police and has been held ever since without trial under Malaysia's Internal Security Act. The closest linkage in the ASEAN system is reputedly that of the police of the member countries, so the swift transfer of Juliet Chin from one to the other doubtless presented no operational problems. The ASEAN police systems are in turn closely linked with Interpol, as are the Australian Police and they keep a close and focussed watch on "trouble makers".

The charges against Juliet Chin are that in June 1974 she sent a telegram to London asking students there to protest the arrest of Malaysian dissidents in Singapore, that she had sent telegrams to Australia and New Zealand in September 1974 appealing to Malaysian students to protest to the Malaysian High Commissioner in each country the eviction of people from a squatter community in Johore Bahru, and that she had shown slides of the squatter eviction "in fulfillment of the common strategies of the Malaysian Communist United Front".

Juliet Chin has admitted the truth of the first "crime" and denied any knowledge of the other two. There is no indication as to when if ever she will be released. And she has no legal right under Malaysian law to a trial.

Following these trials and arrests "unrest" both on Singapore campuses and those in Malaysia subsided considerably and the Pioneer Industries, among others, could return to normal.

Not Foreign Armies But Local Police

The point is that the multinational Corporations in Southeast Asia exercise authority and enjoy power that has no link with foreign armies. The national governments are prepared with weapons, laws, and policies to control the total situation to assure that the multinationals can operate profitably within their midst without concern for the rights or the needs of the people. The elements of such control include tight restrictions on students, faculty, and even visitors to universities. They include tight controls on what the newspapers print, what kinds of meetings are held, what kinds of organizations can be formed, when and under what conditions political activity can be engaged in, what trade unions workers can join, and what views on such matters as socialism vs. capitalism can be expressed and under what circumstances. The foreign armies are no longer present, but neither are they needed. The local governments with their police, their armies, their prisons and their courts are more than ready and able to provide full protection and profit-making opportunities to the multinational corporations which, in their own way, develop structures of power running through each country in which they operate, while their own power centers are located in New York, in London, in Paris, in Hamburg, or in Tokyo, controlling much and directing much, but being controlled or directed by no government or combination of governments, not even the governments of the countries from whence they have come. They, for now at least, are able to supply what the governments of many Third World countries want most: management skills, industrial technology, marketing networks, access to world markets, vital links to world commerce and trade, profit-making know-how, and investment capital. And the Third World countries have what the multinationals want: government hospitality, tough social control, cheap labor, vast mineral resources, lumber, oil, and, up until now, elites ready to be cooperative.

Thus in the post-Vietnam situation a new imperialism is emerging which has some features that are old and some that are new. The system of private ownership of the means of production is old, but the irrelevance of foreign armies is new. Exploitation of cheap labor is old but the unity of the elites is new. No longer do companies compete to drive each other out of business. They combine forces and set governments competing with each other to get them to come in, while the workers are driven to compete for jobs and bread. And there is a new

ambivalence about communism. Communism now is all right if it stays at home; the new imperialists are ready to do business with the communists, and there are signs that there may be a growing tendency also on the communist side to play it this way, at least for a while. This is new. Newest of all is the dynamic and ungovernable nature of the expanding complex of the multinational corporations. And oldest of all is the somewhat wistful hope that uncontrolled free trade and unrestricted free investment will, in the end, be good for everyone.

Perhaps the American interest in preserving the mythology of armed might is, itself. more tied to the operational needs of the multinational corporations and the success of their system than it is to military might as such. The United States has the dubious distinction of being the largest seller of military weapons in the world, with the Shah of Iran and Israel our best customers. The huge Northrup Corporation has recently admitted that it has bribed Middle East governments to buy arms from Northrup rather than from a non-American competitor. It offers the excuse that this practice has helped fill the balance of payments gap and provide jobs for American workers. In other words the advantage even they point to in public justification is that the international arms trade makes the system work better, not that it provides needed military protection.

The Responsibility of Friends

So, what can we say as Friends? If this is the world we are in, is it still not better at many points than the one we are leaving behind? And is it not far better at least at one point, if it is true that international armed aggression is now irrelevant in Southeast Asia? And how can Friends who are moved not by complex analyses of bewildering events but by leadings

of the Spirit which deal not with passing conditions but with that which is deeper and more enduring, - how can Friends find unity about anything as inaccessible to the Light as a multinational corporation? Or 500 of them? Very likely if we try it should be with clearness not to substitute either abstract theory or ideology for Inner Light. We do not need to confront one another with our theories but to be seekers together in these times. Even so, there are points where our responsibilities to each other and the responsibilities of world structures of power are clearly connected.

Development for Whom?

There is growing awareness and acknowledgement that what goes under the label of "development" is not fulfilling the optimistic predictions of enthusiasts for private enterprise who have predicted it will bring prosperity for all. Thus far in most of the Third World, if not all of it, the processes of multinational corporate development have resulted in the rich getting richer and the poor poorer. No less an advocate of the private enterprise system than Robert S. McNamara of the World Bank has put it this way: 11

"Let us suppose that the Second Development Decade's 6% growth target were in fact to be accomplished by 1980. Would that achievement, in itself, guarantee a significant advance in the quality of life for the majority of the two billion people who live in our development member countries?

"The frank answer is no.

"The answer is no because the increases in national income - as essential as they are - will not benefit the poor unless they reach the poor.

"They have not reached the poor to any significant degree in most developing countries in the past, and this in spite of historically unprecedented average rates of growth throughout the sixties."

He goes on to say:

"The miracle of the Green Revolution may have arrived, but for the most part the poor farmer has not been able to participate in it. What these men want are jobs for their survival, food for their families, and a future for their children. They want the simple satisfaction of working toward something better: toward an end of misery and a beginning of hope. We are talking about hundreds of millions of desperately poor people throughout the whole of the developing world. We are talking about 40% of entire populations. Development is simply not reaching them in any decisive degree. Their countries are growing in gross economic terms. But their individual lives are stagnating in human terms."

The same thing is being said increasingly, but not more eloquently, by others, - both critics of orthodox development planning and its advocates. Stated this way brings matters closer to what we as Friends are able to try to answer.

When a need exists, or when a process is victimizing people our place is to be with the victims, and to deal with them not with condescension but as children of the Light. It is as simple and as complex as that.

John Woolman, the 18th century American Quaker, lived at a time when the American Indians were being driven out of their lands and slaughtered. He went and lived amongst them seeking that "I might learn something from them and that the leading of love and truth in me might be of some service to them."

Today governments in Southeast Asia, determined to protect the multinational imperialism, imprison without trial both students and intellectuals who are concerned about multinational victimization and those who are victimized

This is nothing new to Friends. Friends have long known what the inside of prisons look like. We have gone there to visit the victims and we have gone to jail, imprisoned ourselves. The earliest Friends organization was a group called the Meeting for Sufferings, concerned about the condition of Friends in prison.

In this terrible century there have been Friends who, when faced with the bewildering ways in which power has been used, have simplified their lives and have found their witness by seeing who the victims were and going to be with them. This took Friends to France, to Germany and to Russia in 1918 and 1919. It took American Friends into Appalachia in the 1930s. It took British Friends and others to China in the 1940s, and Friends to Japan and Korea in the late '40s and early '50s. It took many of us to Vietnam in the' '60s and the '70s. When our brothers and our sisters have gone to prison for refusing to fight in wars, or because they were black and brave, we have gone there too and cast our lot with their's. When the struggle was in the streets we too have been there bearing a non-violent but by no means non-partisan witness. We know which side we are on. We can tell by seeing who is denied freedom and dignity and a chance to be fully human. It is as terrible and as simple as that and we live without apology and without regret save for the times that we have been too blind or too confused to stand up and be counted.

At the same time when we are faced today with new and perplexing opportunities to be at our best neither can we turn away from the unfinished tasks and identifications already undertaken. To you, dear Friends here in Australia, we ask, "How is it with the Aborigines? Do they see us as their sisters and their brothers? Do we see them in the same way?"

We want peace. But are we working for justice? In the booklet *Helder Camara's Latin America* Friend Betty Richardson Nute describes how several thousand peasants, townsfolk, and church and lay people launched a movement, an action movement whose motto is "Action, Justice, and Peace", which takes as its credo a Pope's words, "If you want peace, work for justice!" Led by the simple and direct Archbishop of Recife in Brazil, whom many call the Martin Luther King of Latin America, the movement declares, "Peace is our ideal, but not a false

peace. . . Not the deceitful peace that conceals injustice and rottenness." ¹² This movement struggles against the social injustice, oppression and cruelty that afflicts a whole continent where, as in many parts of Asia, the vestiges of feudalism, the continuing commitments to the system developed under colonialism, and the new imperialism exist and maintain each other, side by side.

What of justice for the Aborigines within the continuing colonialism of White Australia? Have the bright promises of the new government been realized? What is being done about Aboriginal land ownership rights? About autonomous control of Reserves? About protected rights to natural resources, land compensation, and the sacred areas situated on "Crown Lands"? Are Friends joined in the struggle to see that justice is done? Do we visit the courts, monitor the justice system, raise our voices against a double standard of justice, contribute to bail funds and legal fees, and make injustice visible?

Are we willing to work under Aboriginal direction in the causes they designate as vital, - miserable housing, equal access to education, poor health and the shockingly high rates of infant mortality? Malnutrition damages an infants' brain and the injury is permanent. Do the small and heroic autonomous programs started by the Aborigines themselves all over Australia feel supported and understood and strengthened in concrete ways by Friends who, without tying strings to their support, work in subordinate roles for what they perceive to be the cause of common humanity?

To ourselves as we return to the States we ask ourselves how we can help our American "third world" brothers and sisters (the Blacks, the American Indians, the Chicanos, and the Asian-Americans) see themselves as part of the larger Third World in which we have lived these past four years? And how can we help our friends in Southeast Asia realize in a deeper way that all Americans are not whites to be thought of as Europeans, but also many are black, or brown of many shades, and think of themselves as part of the wider Third World human identity. And how can we help White America to be less smug about its multinational corporations and more concerned with the 40% who are victimized by them? 40% or more. There is a new kind of imperialism and we are a part of it. How do we find freedom amongst its victims?

We have wondered this: Can the newly emerging struggle both of men and of women. but more of women than of men by far, for a more humanized society where sex roles are not taught to little children. - roles designed to rob people of their freedom as humans,

Can the movement for the liberation of women be a means as well as an end? The end must be no less than full equality, freedom, and justice. but the means can be a new appreciation by people of many races. countries, and social-economic systems of the roles that women as fully free human beings can play in building new societies.

Why is International Women's Year dismissed as irrelevant by over half of the earth's women? Were the voices of the poor and discriminated against women really heard in Mexico City? Were the voices of their husbands crying for jobs and of their children asking for food heard through them'? Arc they heard here in Australia? Or in America'?

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of the person and the family, including food, clothing, housing. health, and medical care, and necessary social services and the right to social security.

Yet black Australian women are wives of men and mothers of children who suffer from one of the world's highest infant mortality rates. the highest proportion of any nationality confined in jails, alarmingly high leprosy and TB rates, life expectancy significantly lower than the white average, and for those who do survive poverty. ¹³ Almost the same words could be used to describe a shame-fully high proportion (some say as high as one-fourth to two-thirds) of women in the U.S. minority population.

Why is not more done about this by the privileged women? Does their remoteness from and lack of emphasis on issues related to the 40% or more women who are unreached by social and economic development flow from their direct or shared involvement in the elitism and status symbolized and expressed by the new multinational power structures? Is there a conflict of interest even in the midst of the new feminist consciousness of Women's International Year, - a conflict that separates women along class lines and sets the privileged women at a distance from their poorer sisters even as their consciousness of their community of interest and condition as women is in other ways enhanced?

At a recent seminar in Penang in Malaysia this was a question raised by a university lecturer who happened to be a man, and it was underscored by another university lecturer, a woman, when she said that the rural women of Malaysia

know little or nothing about the issues of International Women's Year, caught as they are in their poverty, and pressed down by their double work load, at home and in the fields.

As one Friend has put it, "Some of us feel clear that as far as possible the peace worker should be disburdened of attachments to any certain level of income or status in society. I t was not said that 'you must not' or that 'you shall not' serve God and Mammon. It was said simply that you cannot. We do not guess how far we are in fact serving Mammon until we seriously contemplate stepping down beside the three-fourths of the human family who live in hunger and peril and under the disdain of our fellow human beings." ¹⁴

If what Robert McNamara said is true the processes of development that we have seen are processes that link the elites of countries, both developed and undeveloped, into relations of cooperative and mutually enriching power, - but 40% (40% or more) - are left worse off than before. The strength of this new system does not rely on armies but on the elites joining together for their mutual enrichment and enjoyment of power.

In every country, as this process goes forward, there is a counter-process that runs in the opposite direction. There is a large and growing number who are not a part of the prosperity, whose voices are not heard, whose opportunities are more and more restricted, and whose bitterness and alienation is deepening and widening. This is true not only in Southeast Asian cities like Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok,- or even Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. It is also true in the great cities of the developed countries. It certainly is true in New York. It certainly is true in Philadelphia. Is it true also in Australia? - In Sydney? In Melbourne? In Brisbane? To the extent that it is true it poses problems of the most perplexing sort. It does not by any means suggest that a new unity of the disinherited born of their shared despair is about to be achieved. It may mean just the opposite. It may mean new and effective centers of power for the elites and built-in conflict of vital interest among the poor.

When multinational corporations move their electronic assembly plants from New England to Singapore or Penang, and pay young Chinese and Malay women less in a day than American workers would get in an hour for doing the same work, this builds unity among the American and the Malaysian and the Singaporean elites (they share the wealth), but it builds rivalry and desperate competition amongst the workers. They share the poverty. It sets them at each other's throats for jobs and bread. When agro-industrial enterprises cordon off

great tracts of land for banana or oil-palm plantations and the peasants are driven off the land and into the urban slums, it is the new elites who come into power and inherit the earth itself. When people are so set against each other, is dialogue possible?

In Vietnam at the height of the war, Americans and Vietnamese discovered how to talk. When our young people became war resisters the Vietnamese invited us to meet with them in Bratislava, in Helsinki, in Stockholm, and even in Hanoi. A climate was created within our country that made it possible to build a movement out of this dialogue. It became a movement of power.

It is that kind of dialogue and that kind of response today that must somehow be generated between those who are the victims of the new imperialism now rapidly taking over in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. and those of the countries from whence it flows who are ready to challenge it and resist. There must be a sense of unity, and of shared effort. There must be witness to a new kind of community. In this is there a place for Friends?

Positive Action - An Approach

We cannot prescribe a program. That will emerge out of many influences and efforts. But it is possible based on past experience to suggest a few things that need to be done:

1. There needs to be research. There needs to be accurate information. The truth is something more than the facts but dealing openly with facts is essential to being publishers of truth. The new non-military imperialism is complex and many of the facts about it are carefully hidden, though not inaccessible. In the U.S.A. the AFSC's NARMIC program was launched to uncover the facts about the military and industrial linkages. NARMIC means national action research military industrial complex. It is composed of young researchers and analysts, working together on a subsistence basis. and producing analytical reports, both printed and in the form of slide shows dealing with the American military-industrial complex. There needs to be something like NARMIC working on the non-military power of the multinational corporations.

It is surprising how much can be learned if people know what questions to ask. Much of NARMIC's information has come right from the Pentagon. They have first decided as precisely as they could what they wanted to find

out, and then they have gone there and asked. It isn't all that simple but it is to some extent that simple.

2. There needs to be new publishers of truth. One of the most important developments connected with Vietnam was the Pentagon Papers. These became public when it was no longer possible for Daniel E1\sberg from within the Pentagon, and the New York Times and the Washington Post from within the establishment to be a part of the conspiracy of silence that had enabled government departments and officials to keep the truth about Vietnam hidden from the American people.

The truth has great power. That is why there is so much effort made to keep it from being published, or even leaked. People from within the corporate structures involved in the new imperialism need to be encouraged. They can become publishers of truth. There must be an atmosphere that acknowledges the virtue and the ethical responsibility of people within our corporate life, both in the government and in the private sector who publish the truth when to remain silent is to be accomplices in the abuse of power and in the victimization of people. This applies especially to people in the large international agencies and in the universities and the large foundations which supply the funds and the research essential to the development of under-development and making it permanent. The people working in such structures need help and encouragement to let the truth be known.

3. People need to work together. Armed with the facts it becomes possible to build "people-collaboration". It is not acceptable for people from America to come to Southeast Asia and tell the Southeast Asians what their responsibilities are, and what they should do. But it is possible to tell them what we are doing, what is being done by people facing the same or similar forces back home. Instead of trying to bare our wisdom we need to bear our witness. The NARMIC slide shows on the war in Vietnam were effective in Southeast Asia precisely because they did not attempt to tell Southeast Asians what they should do, but rather were addressed to the people of the United States, and dealt with their responsibilities. Asians could see them without feeling preached to. That way they could get the message and respond and they did.

We need to start where we are, be consistent there, and let the truth be known. Seeking the truth, publishing the truth and learning how to share it in terms of witness - those are the next steps.

John Wilhelm Rowntree. British Quaker who died in 1905, once said. "We stand today in the midst of widespread materialism- a little handful of men and women called to be heralds of the peaceful Gospel. Around us even the churches seem to share in the false imperialism of the age. [s not the reproach of their silence laid upon us. that we. in their default. may once again bear practical testimony to the spiritual simplicity of the Kingdom of God and the' higher possibilities of human life?" ¹⁵

Today, many of the churches, and particularly the vital growing edge within the churches. are doing better. There are the Catholic radicals in Latin America and in the Philippines. There is the vigorous minority within the Protestant churches and councils. And there are Friends. All of us, faced with the false imperialism of the age must once again bear practical testimony to the spiritual simplicity of the Kingdom of God and the higher possibilities of human life.

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